University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019
2013

African Regional Organizations And Democracy
Stephanie Schoppert
University of Central Florida

Part of the International Relations Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Schoppert, Stephanie, "African Regional Organizations And Democracy" (2013). Electronic Theses and
Dissertations, 2004-2019. 2578.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/2578

AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DEMOCRACY

by
STEPHANIE SCHOPPERT
B.A. University of Central Florida, 2009

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the department of Political Science
in the College of Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Spring Term
2013

i

ABSTRACT

Instability and political repression are two reasons why many states in Africa are unable
to develop. African regional organizations have the potential to encourage democracy, stability
and development within their regions if they have the right tools. Using case studies of two
major interventions by African regional organizations this thesis will determine what those tools
may be. Both the intervention of ECOWAS into Liberia and the SADC into the DRC were rife
with problems but they were able to bring some stability and even democracy to states in crisis.
This thesis finds that African regional organizations can promote democracy and stability, but
the focus is always on stability for the region. With strong institutions and mandates, policy
agreement and strong leadership, African regional organizations can bring stability, development
and even democracy to their regions.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Liberia was meant to be a new start and a brighter future for former slaves in the United
States. Yet, instead of being a haven of peace and freedom, Liberia became known for a violent
civil war that erupted from years of autocracy and repression. The international community
turned their back on the civil war, leaving one African regional organization with little option but
to intervene. With no preparation for peacekeeping missions and nothing beyond an economic
focus, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) embarked on a military
intervention to return peace and stability to Liberia. In an effort to bring lasting stability, a
democratic government was created and supported by ECOWAS. This intervention was the first
time that any economic regional organization intervened militarily in a member state, and it
raises numerous questions about the potential of African regional organizations to promote
democracy and stability in their regions.
Since gaining their independence, numerous African countries have struggled to build
stable and economically developed regimes. There have been dozens of theories levied by both
the international community and within African states on how to solve the problem of stalled
African development. Many African nations do not have the stable democracies that many
western nations believe is necessary for sustained development. Autocratic and unstable regimes
are rife throughout the continent and finding a solution to bring about greater stability to these
states, has led to a focus on African regional organizations.
Several regional organizations have been created since African states gained
independence to promote economic development and regional stability. However, there are
1

questions as to whether regional organizations have the ability to promote stability and change
within their regions. This thesis will begin to answer the question of whether or not African
regional organizations have the ability to work together to influence change within member
states and the region as a whole.
African regional organizations are defined as organizations of states brought together
with economic and developmental goals, and with a regional component. Both ECOWAS and
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are regional in their design and have the
goals to promote economic growth, stability and development within their regions.
This study will examine whether or not African regional organizations have the ability to
promote democracy, stability and economic development within member states. Leaders of
unstable regimes and powerful autocracies are members of these organizations, but the belief
within African regional organizations is that democracy is the key to development and stability. 1
Cases of intervention by the SADC and ECOWAS will be examined to better understand
whether African regional organizations have the ability to promote stability and democracy
within their region. The two organizations were started on the principles of good governance and
economic development. Both of these organizations focused primarily on economic development
and international trade, but they also promoted democracy, human rights and the rule of law as
integral to their missions.

1

(Nathan, 2012)
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Research Questions
The primary research question is whether African regional organizations have the ability
to promote stability and democracy. This includes whether regional organizations have the
ability to directly influence member states and what structures are necessary for this influence to
be successful. One of the prominent theories regarding regional organizations and their ability to
promote democracy suggests that only regional organizations with a majority membership of
democracies will be able to effectively promote democracy. 2 However, African regional
organizations have intervened in member states to promote stability and democracy even when
they have a majority membership of autocracies.3 Determining whether or not these interventions
were successful will be part of the focus of the case studies.
If African regional organizations can promote democracy and stability within their
regions, what resources and structures need to be in place? Does the regional organization have
to have a certain democratic functioning or do the majority of the states need to have similar
interests in any situation? In the case of ECOWAS in Liberia in 1990, many states within
ECOWAS saw intervention as necessary to their own security. With the SADC intervention in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), there was little consensus on the need to intervene or
the best methods of bringing about stability. Understanding the successes and failures of these
interventions is pivotal to understanding other interventions by African regional organizations
and their potential for creating stability and change in the future.

2

(Pevehouse, 2002a)
Both of the cases studied in this thesis consisted of regional organizations with majority membership of
autocracies.
3

3

Conceptual Framework
The main hypothesis within this paper is that there are three components of regional
organizations that will increase the chances that a military intervention will lead to democracy
and stability. The stronger and more prevalent the policy agreement of member states, the
presence of a single regional hegemon and clearly defined institutions, the more likely that
interventions and initiatives by the regional organization will be successful. An intervention may
be successful without all three of these components, but the help of a stronger international
organization is often necessary.
Several assumptions lie within this work and the first is that African states and regional
organizations prefer stability within the region and within their own state. Often states will make
decisions based upon their own impressions of what will benefit them. Many ECOWAS
members feared that during the Liberian civil war the fighting would spread to neighboring
countries creating greater instability within the region. Both Mali and Niger decided to send
troops to help the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, on the belief that it would help move
potential dissident soldiers out of the country.
The second assumption is that members of a regional organization support the principles
of the regional organization that they belong to, at least in regard to the other members. In both
ECOWAS and the SADC, democracy is one of the underlying principles and goals of the
organization4, and yet we see very few member states run as democracies throughout much of
these organizations’ histories. However, while states may not be willing to move toward
democracy within their own regimes, they are willing to promote that within other members,

4

(ECOWAS, 1993; SADC Secretariat, 1993)
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especially among those neighbors that are unstable. ECOWAS in Liberia supported a democratic
government in Liberia because they felt it was the most likely way to prevent further violence. 5

Methodology
In order to understand how the structures and states within African regional organizations
work together, both ECOWAS and the SADC will be examined in depth. The creation and the
protocols of the organizations will be studied to see how the goals of the organization were
achieved prior to intervention. A closer look at how the member states work together to achieve
previously agreed upon goals and initiatives will provide insight into to how those states can also
work together to intervene in states suffering from instability and violence.
The interventions of ECOWAS into Liberia will be examined to see not only whether or
not the organization was successful in intervening, but also the reasons for the intervention. The
ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was chosen for this study because it was the first intervention
by ECOWAS and the first military intervention by any economic regional organization.
Understanding what caused the organization to decide to finally intervene in the severe
instability of a member state is crucial to understanding the circumstances under which an
African regional organization will intervene not only politically but militarily in the affairs of
another state. The crisis in Liberia also pitted the two sides of ECOWAS against each other, as
the Anglophone and Francophone states fought for power and status within ECOWAS and the
international community.

5

(Alao, Mackinlay, & Olonisakin, 1999, p. 104)
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The SADC intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo was chosen not only
because it was one of the first military interventions by the SADC, but also it was one of the few
interventions by the SADC that involved in some way, all of the member states. Other
interventions by the SADC were spearheaded or enacted solely by a few states, but the conflict
in the DRC prompted a response from all members of the SADC. The split on how to handle the
situation in the Congo was so severe that it threatened to destroy the entire regional organization.
An extensive review of previous literature will examine regional organizations and their
ability to function and create democracy within member states. An examination of the current
theories on African regional organizations will determine if they have the power or the influence
to enact lasting change within the region. Following the literature review will be a discussion on
the methodology used to conduct the case studies. This will include discussions of conceptual
definitions and databases used in the research.
In four sections this thesis will analyze what aspects of African regional organizations are
necessary for successful functioning and what aspects can be detrimental both to the regional
organization and the member states. The first section will outline the history and the structures of
both ECOWAS and the SADC.
The next section will detail the ECOWAS intervention into the Liberian civil war.
ECOWAS was a major player in the civil war until the democratic election of Charles Taylor in
1997. When instability returned to the region both ECOWAS and the UN returned to Liberia,
which led to another free and fair election in 2006. The decision to intervene in Liberia was not
unanimous but ECOWAS was still able to eventually bring stability to the state, with more states
joining the cause as time progressed.

6

The third section details the SADC intervention into the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The intervention severely split the SADC when President Mugabe of Zimbabwe authorized a
military intervention into the DRC by the SADC without even consulting the majority of
members or the SADC chairman. Three states intervened militarily in the DRC; Zimbabwe,
Angola and Namibia, while the other members of the organization sought a diplomatic solution
to the crisis.
The final section will analyze what structures and aspects of each regional organization
were successful in the interventions and what aspects were detrimental to the mediations. Both
organizations had successes and failures because of their interventions but only one paved the
way for lasting stability. The section will also examine to what extent did the stability and the
regimes of the member states themselves, affect the ability of the regional organization to
function. The extent to which the regional organizations have moved toward stability will also
be examined to see whether or not membership in the regional organization may have a positive
influence on promoting stability and democracy within member states, without direct
intervention.

7

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Despite the preponderance of studies on international organizations, studies on regional
organizations are less common, and research into African regional organizations even less so.
Discussions on what areas of policy international organizations have influence on include
democratic transitions, human rights, resolution of conflict, stability and economic growth. The
potential connection between membership in international organizations and transitions to
democracy is the focus of this work, so a thorough understanding of not only the influence of
regional organizations on member states but also of democratization is essential.

International Organizations
The suggestion that regional organizations can prompt transitions to democracy means
that international organizations may have the ability to influence member states. While there is
no debate that alliances between states or treaties between states can be created and adhered to,
as long as all states have something to gain, the idea that international organizations themselves
can create change is under debate. One of the staunchest critics to the potential influence of
international organizations on their member states has been Mearscheimer. In a realist view on
international organizations, Mearscheimer argued that international organizations are nothing
more than mirrors of the international system. 6 They are a different manifestation of the balance
of power and that anything done by an international organization could have just as easily been
done with an alliance between several states with similar national interests.

6

(Mearschimer, 1994, p. 7)
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If the realist view presented by Mearscheimer is true then what reason do states have to
work through international organizations at all? For the past several decades, most interactions
between states have involved some form of international organization. Abbott and Snidal argue
that international organizations do offer more than simple alliances or the balance of power.
States can use international organizations to provide a stable negotiating forum for interactions
between states, to manage joint operations, provide a sense of norms for the community, and
perhaps most importantly, to provide neutrality. 7 In several interventions led by the ECOWAS
and the SADC, regional hegemons chose to work through the regional organization in order to
give their operations neutrality. Nigeria used ECOWAS to gain allies for the Liberia
intervention, and for the intervention to appear neutral, rather than as a military invasion by
Nigeria.
Abbott and Snidal argue that there are significant benefits to states working through
international organizations to achieve their goals. For organizations such as ECOWAS and the
SADC there is also an economic benefit, through trade relationships, to being a member. These
benefits may give international organizations the ability to influence policy within member
states. This occurs when the member state has something to lose if they are rejected from the
organization. If the benefit of staying in the organization is greater than the cost of conforming to
the policy mandate of the organization; the member state is likely to conform. It is this logic that
might explain why Russett and Oneal found that states that have economic trade relationships are
less likely to fight each other and states that are members of international organizations are less
likely to fight each other.8 The benefits of remaining a member of good standing within the
organization are higher than the cost of not engaging in conflict with another member state.
7
8

(Abbott & Snidal, 1998, pp. 10-23)
(Oneal & Russett, 2001)
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Conversely, if an organization pushes an autocracy toward democracy, the costs of remaining in
the organization become too high, as the autocratic leader would sacrifice too much to become
democratic. 9
Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom found that intergovernmental organizations have the
ability to reduce the likelihood of conflict among member states, exacerbate the likelihood of
conflict, or have no effect on conflict, depending on the strength and prevalence of certain
components. The likelihood that member states within a regional organization decreases with
higher the levels of institutionalism and member cohesiveness and if the organizational mandate
addresses security concerns. 10 Hansen, Mitchell and Nemeth also found that the more
institutionalized the organization, the more likely it was to settle disputes and the less likely it
was to have conflict between member states. 11

Intervention
While international organizations can decide to suspend a member state from the
organization if they do not conform to organization mandate, the international organization may
also choose to intervene. Intervention and peacekeeping operations are another way that
international organizations may prompt transitions to democracy within member states. Fortuna
found that intervention into conflict ridden states by the international community is more likely
to lead to peace and that peace is more likely to last.12 Despite the likelihood of promoting peace,
Bueno de Mesquita and Downs found that military intervention was unlikely to lead to

9

(Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 137)
(Boehmer, Gartzke, & Nordstrom, 2004, p. 29)
11
(Hansen, Mitchell, & Nemeth, 2008, p. 29)
12
(Fortna, 2004, p. 285)
10

10

democracy, especially if the intervention was led by an autocracy. 13 They even go as far as to
argue that autocratic states would not support democratic transitions following a military
intervention in another state.14 15Research by Van de Leuten and Hoffman on what causes
international organizations to intervene found that democratic organizations were more likely to
intervene in states where democratic principles were violated. However, in cases where the
organization did not intervene, the organization lost standing and influence in the international
community. 16
African regional organizations are in areas where development and civil liberties are
often limited or even nonexistent. Therefore, the potential of regional organizations to not only
bring economic development to the region, but democracy is intriguing. Do African regional
organizations have the institutions in place to be able to influence policy within member states or
can they perform interventions that not only bring peace but democracy as well?

Democratization
Studying democratization has become more and more sophisticated throughout the years.
Through these studies one common trend has surfaced, the correlation between democracy and
economic development.17 What is under debate is whether or not development is causation or
correlation to democracy. Prezeworski et al. found that there was no link between levels of
economic development and transitions to democracy. 18 Their findings were disputed by Boix and

13

(Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006, p. 647)
(Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006, p. 643)
15
It is important to note that the focus of Bueno de Mesquita and Downs’ research is on an individual intervener or
intervention by the UN Security Council, and not on interventions by a regional or international organization.
16
(Van Der Vlueten & Hoffmann, 2010, p. 754)
17
(Geddes, 2007, p. 318)
18
(Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000, p. 106; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997, p. 167)
14
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Stokes, who found that economic development does contribute to democratic transitions, with
the level of development being extremely significant for predicting democratic transitions prior
to 1950, and only slightly significant post-1950.19 Epstein et al. present a middle ground, where
development can be linked to democratic transitions in states that are partial democracies (Polity
IV score of +1 to +7), but development has less effect on transitioning full autocracies (Polity IV
score of 0 to -10) to full democracies (Polity IV score of +8 to +10).20
The link between development and democratic transitions can help explain why African
states turned toward democracy after periods of instability. As Epstein et al. suggest it was as the
power of the autocracy declined and the level of development rose, that democratic transitions
were most likely. For ECOWAS states there was a period of instability in the late 1990s, where
many authoritarian regimes were struggling to maintain power and were steadily going through
periods of development. In every state that experienced this weakening of the state and building
of development, instability followed and that was in turn followed by democracy. This was true
regardless of whether or not ECOWAS intervened.
Another prospect toward democratization especially in Africa is the connection with the
gap between rich and the poor and democratic transition. This gap is more striking in African
states than perhaps anywhere else in the world, where elites in Zaire in the 1990s, were among
the richest men in the world at the same time that the majority of the country lived in dire
poverty. Under this theory the rulers present aspects of democracy in order to coerce the
population into agreeing to higher tax rates in return for liberalization. Since it is easier for an
authoritarian regime to collect taxes on a consenting public, they are likely to offer representative

19
20

(Boix & Stokes, 2003, p. 531)
(Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, & O'Halloran, 2006, p. 566)
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institutions in order to increase tax revenue. 21 The same is true in cases where the population can
easily move away; an authoritarian leader may offer aspects of democracy in order to convince
people to stay.22
The problem with these models is that they require mobility of capital in order for the
elite rulers to move toward democratization on their own and that democratization must always
be elite-led. Within Africa, transitions to democracy often follow periods of political instability
in which rebel groups rise up against the elite-run government. Rarely have authoritarian leaders
willingly given up control of the government. Burton, Gunther and Higley address this concern
by identifying the leaders of the opposing groups within the state as elites themselves. Once they
rise to the head of an opposition group, they are among the elite and it is therefore a negotiation
between the old and new elite that leads to democracy. 23 Rustow makes a similar argument
stating that democratization occurs when there is conflict between opposition groups and an
authoritarian regime, notably those which include conflict between old and new elites.24
Other studies of democratization include models which search for simple links between
elements of democratization, but there is as of yet no universal explanation of what leads to
democratization. Acemoglu and Robinson present a model in which nondemocratic countries are
ruled by a rich elite and that the poor can rise up at times when opportunity cost is low, such as
during a recession. The uprising can force the elite to move toward democracy to prevent
revolution while still consolidating power.25 Zak and Feng present a model in which the
determinants of democratic transitions were per capita income, distribution of wealth,

21

(Bates & Lien, 1985, pp. 64-65)
(Geddes, 2007, p. 326)
23
(Burton, Gunther, & Higley, 1992, p. 4)
24
(Rustow, 1970, pp. 352-357)
25
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001, pp. 938-939)
22
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educational levels and strength for political preferences and civil liberties. Their model predicts
the chances of a democratic transition at any point in time. This model is useful for studying
African transitions because it not only takes into account aspects of development but the political
preferences and desire for civil liberties of the people within the state. In 1999, the Zak and Feng
model predicted that the democratic prospects were not high for Zaire, Malawi, Angola, Guinea,
Togo, or Niger.26 Their predictions proved to be true as only Zaire (now the DRC), Malawi and
Niger are currently moving in the direction of stable democracy and Niger’s regime has changed
frequently over the years. 27
The democratization process is a multi-faceted process but most importantly for the case
studies and the organizations that follow, is the perceived link between development and
democracy. As these economic organizations were formed with a desire to promote
development, there was an understanding that this would likely lead to democratic transitions.
The link between opposition elites and democratic transitions will also be useful in explaining
how the instability within Africa led to a wave of democratization, especially within ECOWAS.
Yet, there is a final facet of the democratization process. Pevehouse argues that
democratization can come from membership within democratic regional organizations. His
model shows that states who are members of an organization in which a majority of the states
have a Polity IV score of +6 or higher, are likely to transition to democracy. 28 This outside-in
approach, if true, can provide a way for poor, underdeveloped countries to transition to more
democratic regimes without the struggle of increased development or violent transition. Putting

26

(Zak & Feng, 2003)
(Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)
28
(Pevehouse, 2002a, p. 529)
27
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Pevehouse’s theory into the context of African regional organizations is the inspiration for this
research.

African Regional Organizations and Democracy
The existing research into African regional organizations is limited to analysis of
different aspects of attempts at intervention. The focus of these studies rests on the success or
failure and what led to the end result. Few studies have been presented on the strength of the
organization itself to promote democracy, either through its institutions or intervention. There
has also been limited discussion on what institutions and structures within African regional
organizations are needed to promote democracy both through peaceful means and through
intervention. The purpose of this thesis is to help fill some of the gaps in African regional
organization research.
While the research by Pevehouse did not directly address African regional organizations,
the research by Olonisakin and Levitt did. They found that it was democratic transitions within
member states that prompted the creation of stronger and more democratic institutions within
ECOWAS and the SADC. 29 Therefore, the institutions would only be strong enough to influence
transitions to democracy after states had already transitioned to democracy. The more democratic
the member states became, the more changes occurred to the institutions within the regional
organizations. This suggests that democratic transition in African states may be a bottom-up
approach through development and elite confrontation as other research into democratization

29

(Olonisakin & Levitt, 1999, p. 76)
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processes has presented. Tsie had similar findings in that the institutions within the SADC were
not strong enough to promote democratic transitions within the region. 30
Zartman found that regional hegemons, working through regional organizations, were
more likely to be the method of conflict resolution in Africa over the Organization of African
Unity/ African Union (OAU/AU). Regional hegemons in Africa, while stronger than other states
in the region are still relatively weak and therefore need the support of other states within the
regional organization. Also working through the regional organization lends legitimacy to the
actions taken by the hegemon while still allowing the hegemon to have most of the control over
the intervention. 31 This was seen in the intervention into Liberia by ECOWAS and the
intervention into the DRC by the SADC.
Aning found that the security mechanisms within ECOWAS are weak and largely flawed.
While the focus on good governance, democracy and stability are essential for West Africa’s
future, the organization currently lacks the capacity to deal with the current problems facing the
region. Aning proposes a four tier system with complete oversight over policy and objectives,
operations and tactics only under the purview of key personnel, and with the inclusion of civil
society organizations to act as additional oversight and counteract the suspicion between
“political and security elites.” 32 Aning’s analysis of the structures needed to create a stronger
collective security system within ECOWAS is a start to understanding the key structures needed
for both the SADC and ECOWAS to effectively promote democracy and stability within their
regions.

30

(Tsie, 1996, pp. 85-86)
(Zartman, 2003, p. 100)
32
(Aning, 2004, pp. 541-542)
31
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As these organizations are still new it will take more research to understand what impact
they have had on the development and democratic transitions of their regions. Continuing
research will be able to determine the role that these organizations will have with recent changes
to structure and regarding new intervention efforts. This thesis intends to add to the dialogue of
the potential effect of regional organizations in Africa so that their future influence can be better
understood.

17

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

With limited research on African regional organizations and a substantial need for
progress within African states, extended research into what role African regional organizations
play is necessary for understanding the best way forward. If African regional organizations have
been successful in moving states in conflict toward stability and democracy, then current
operations by these organizations may also have the potential for success. Research by
Pevehouse and his colleagues has shown that regional organizations in other areas around the
world have been able to promote transitions to democracy, provided that the membership of the
organization is mostly democracies.33 Yet, when ECOWAS and the SADC were formed they
existed with a large majority of autocracies, and still intervened in states and promoted
transitions to democracy. Today both these organizations have a majority membership of
democracies, understanding the role that ECOWAS and the SADC played in these transitions to
democracy can provide new insight into top-down approaches to democratic transitions.
Due to the fact that there has only been limited research into the link between African
regional organizations and democracy and stability within member states, case studies were
chosen. Using case studies will allow for a deeper understanding of the potential causes of these
interventions and transitions to democracy and the role that African regional organizations
played. It also gives an opportunity to understand other factors that may have influenced the
actions of the regional organizations. Using comparative analysis between the two major case
studies will allow for a greater understanding of how changes in structure, member cohesion and
dominant players affect the ability of the regional organization to be successful in their goals.

33

(Pevehouse, 2002a, 2002b; Pevehouse & Russett, 2006)
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The purpose of this research is to understand the conditions under which African regional
organizations are successful at promoting democracy and stability through intervention.
Therefore, it is hypothesized that intervention by African regional organizations into states in
conflict will be successful if the intervention is led by an organization with majority agreement
on policy concerns, includes the support of a regional hegemon and that the organization has
strong, clearly defined institutions. While it is not necessary for an intervention to have all three
components to move a state toward stability and democracy, the more present and prevalent
these conditions the more likely the intervention will be successful and that stability will last.
Mill’s Methods of Agreement and Difference allow for situations to be examined in a
way that determines the conditions that are sufficient for a certain effect. Using case studies that
contain some aspect of each method of the hypothesis and case studies that do not have some
aspect of the hypothesis, the causal factors that are sufficient for a successful intervention are
determined. By studying the causal factors that are present or missing from each intervention the
importance and the necessity of each causal factor can be determined. Case studies were found in
which each causal factor in the hypothesis were present or missing, with the exception of the
presence of strong, clearly defined institutions. This missing factor will be discussed later.
Using Mill’s Methods of Agreement and Difference several cases of intervention by
African regional organizations were studied to understand the causal factors to success in
intervention. The cases allow for study of policy agreement and the presence of a hegemon.
However, there have not yet been any cases of intervention by ECOWAS or the SADC in which
strong, clearly defined institutions were present. Currently both organizations have strengthened
and defined their institutions, so future research into the current interventions by the SADC and
ECOWAS will help strengthen this point.
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To understand the link between policy agreement and the success of intervention, the
common goals and national interests of the majority of ECOWAS states in Liberia is studied.
The SADC intervention into the DRC provides an opposite example in which a majority of states
within the organization did not agree on the type of intervention, nor were the goals of
intervention similar. Conversely, there is a brief look into the SADC intervention in Lesotho, in
which a majority of SADC states were united in values and national interests toward the
intervention.
To understand the importance of a regional hegemon, the intervention of ECOWAS of
Liberia shows the effect of one dominant hegemon on an intervention. Conversely, the
intervention of ECOWAS into Guinea-Bissau is briefly examined as that intervention did not
have a dominant hegemon. In terms of the SADC, the intervention into the DRC had two
competing hegemons, while the intervention into Lesotho had two hegemons working together.
These case studies provide a strong foundation for understanding the importance of a regional
hegemon throughout the intervention process.
For the importance of strong and clearly defined institutions both the SADC and
ECOWAS did not have the strong institutions needed in any of their past interventions. While
they were able to achieve some level of success without this component, the interventions were
rife with problems that could have been remedied with better institutions. For the ECOWAS
interventions, there was no security structure or protocol in place prior to the intervention in
Liberia. For the SADC, there was a security structure in place but it was not under the control of
the main body of the SADC, nor were there protocols for its management. Both situations
created very different problems for the organizations that were only overcome by the control of a
regional hegemon or help from other international organizations.
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The case studies control for membership as neither organization was controlled by a
majority membership of democracies at the time of Liberia and the DRC. ECOWAS was
dominated by autocracies. However, the SADC was mixed with 5 states as established
democracies, 4 as anocracies and 2 autocracies. Zimbabwe was an autocracy and a regional
hegemon and fought for dominance with the other regional hegemon, South Africa, a democracy.
Economic development is controlled as both countries had economies that were collapsing at the
time of intervention. In 1988, the GDP growth rate of Liberia was -2, and the GDP growth rate
of the DRC in 1997 was -5.34 Both countries experienced drastic declines in growth rates in the
following year when conflict broke out. The GDP per capita in current US dollars of Liberia in
1988 was $474 while the DRC had a GDP per capita of $131.35 While there is a disparity in the
GDP per capita and the GDP growth rates in the year prior to the outbreak of war, both countries
had low levels of development and economies that collapsed when war broke out.
The economy, regime and stability of Liberia and the DRC are examined in the case
studies to determine if the conditions within the state were the cause of the success or failure of
the interventions. The strength and number of rebel groups is also explored as a potential reason
for the success or failure of intervention, as well as the handling of the military and diplomatic
aspects of the interventions. International support from other states and organizations is also
examined as a potential cause of the success or failure of the interventions.
The success of intervention will be measured in terms of democracy and stability. For the
purposes of simplicity and clarity, democracy will be defined by a +6 to +10 Polity IV score.
Autocracy is defined as -6 to -10. These benchmarks were chosen to exclude anocracies which
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fall between these scores and focus on states at one extreme end of the spectrum or the other.
Polity IV takes into account both democratic and autocratic aspects of government to define a
scale of -10 to +10 with -10 being the most autocratic and +10 being the most democratic. Polity
IV categorizes democracies on the basis of three elements: presence of institutions and
procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences, the existence of
institutionalized constraints on executive power, and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens
in their daily lives and in participation in political activities. 36 Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index and Mo Ibrahim rankings will also be used to determine the quality
of democracy for each state following intervention. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks
states based on public perceptions on corruption using polls and drawing on corruption related
data.37 The Mo Ibrahim index is an annual assessment of African governments; it consists of 88
indicators drawn from 23 independent international data providers. 38
Stability will be defined as a state that does not pose a threat to the region, either through
conflict spillover, economic collapse or refugees. This will include a state that is threatened by
an internal or external violent force or a state that is suffering from a severe economic crisis. It
can also include a state that drastically violates the protocols and mandates of a regional
organization, which threatens the stability and the reputation of the regional organization. If a
state is in severe violation of the principles of a regional organization and the regional
organization does not act, its reputation and influence within the international community is at
risk.
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An intervention will be considered successful if there is democracy and stability in the
state following the intervention. It is important to note that length of the intervention is not
discussed as a contributing factor to the success or failure of the intervention. As some
interventions may take more time than others and some may be more difficult than others, it is
hard to measure failure in terms of a long intervention process. However, reasons for a lengthy
intervention will be discussed to see if they are contributing factors to the decisions made by the
regional organization on how to proceed.
A brief look into other interventions by the SADC and ECOWAS, as well as one case of
non-intervention by the SADC, will offer a more complete picture of African regional
organizations and interventions. Looking at the other interventions will clarify the two cases
studied in depth, by examining the effect of changes in regime, hegemon influence and policy
agreement on intervention success.
Following the case studies there will be comparisons between the ECOWAS and SADC
interventions and conclusions drawn to determine the main goals of the member states of the
regional organization and whether or not these goals were accomplished. The link between
democracy and autocracy and the link between democracy and economy will be discussed to see
how they interact with the goals of the members within a regional organization. Finally the case
studies will be compared to see what aspects of ECOWAS and SADC institutions and values
were necessary for a successful intervention and what institutions and values were missing in
interventions that were not as successful.
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CHAPTER FOUR: BACKGROUND ON ECOWAS AND THE SADC

ECOWAS

ECOWAS Background
The Economic Community of West African States was formed in 1975 following an
initiative by General Gowon of Nigeria and General Eyadema of Togo. General Gowon and
General Eyadema began traveling to West African states in 1972 to present the idea of a regional
trade agreement. When the final draft of the Treaty of ECOWAS was signed, there were 15
signatories. The fifteen original ECOWAS states were Benin, Burkina Faso (then known as
Upper Volta), Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Two years later in 1977, Cape
Verde joined ECOWAS. The organization remained at 16 members until 2000, whaswaen
Mauritania left in order to focus on their membership in Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), believing
that their interests would be better protected in the UMA.
ECOWAS was formed with the intention of promoting cooperation and integration with
member states, as well as the eventual creation of an economic and monetary union. The overall
goal was to create collective economic self-sufficiency among member nations through the
creation of an economic and trading union. The optimism that created ECOWAS did not last as
the organization found it hard to work together and presented few successes within its first few
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decades of existence. The lack of progress and initiative can be linked to economic, cultural and
political factors that affected both individual states and their ability to work together. 39
In 1975, Nigeria was the powerhouse within the region and continues to be so today.
Nigeria maintained a population and Gross National Product that far exceeded that of any other
ECOWAS state, a fact which continued to be true throughout the Liberian crisis. 40 The strength
of Nigeria played a major role in the working of ECOWAS, as several West African states
continue to suffer from extreme poverty and low rankings in human development. The vast
differences in wealth and development, made it hard for some ECOWAS states to trust the
initiatives of Nigeria.41
The division between English speaking and French speaking states also created a problem
for ECOWAS. The nine Francophone and five Anglophone nations continued to harbor tensions
toward each other, as outgrowths of their colonial experience. 42 In order to promote unity within
the organization, French, English and Portuguese were all adopted as official languages. The
chairmanship of ECOWAS also alternated between the Francophone and Anglophone states.
This cultural division played a major role not only in the decision to intervene in Liberia but also
how the intervention was managed. The divisions made it hard for some states to trust the
dominance of Nigeria within ECOWAS and they feared that Nigeria would take over full control
of the organization and the intervention.
The final obstacle for ECOWAS was the political instability within many of the member
states, few states maintained stable regimes and were often occupied with problems within their
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own states. Throughout the first decades of its existence, few ECOWAS countries had stable
democracies or even stable autocracies. This prevented the states from being able to focus on
ECOWAS or creating a true regional trading bloc.

Structure of ECOWAS
ECOWAS has a very specific structure that has changed slightly over the years as the
organization has adjusted to the growing needs of the region. The ultimate authority is the
Authority of Heads of State and Government of Member States. Comprised of the heads of state
of all the member states, the Authority controls the general guidelines and goals of ECOWAS
and gives directives. The Authority meets once a year in order to oversee the functioning of
ECOWAS institutions and the implementation of ECOWAS objectives. It also decides whether a
matter should be handed over to the Community Court of Justice, appoints the Executive
Secretariat (changed to a Commission with a President in 2006), and adheres to all other powers
granted to it by the Treaty. The ECOWAS Treaty (also known as the Treaty of Lagos) was
signed on May, 28, 1975, and established guidelines for cooperation and integration in order to
create an economic and monetary union. The ultimate goal of the treaty was to create economic
growth and development in the region.
The Executive Secretariat used to be named to four year terms and could only be reelected once. The Secretariat was the head of ECOWAS and was responsible for ensuring that
the organization remained true to the Treaty under which it was formed. The Commission now
consists of President, Vice President and seven commissioners. This allows for greater control of
the variety of sectors and institutions within ECOWAS. According to the ECOWAS website “the
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Commission adopts Rules for the implementation of Acts enacted by the Council. These Rules
have the same legal force as Acts enacted by the Council. The Commission makes
recommendations and gives advice. Recommendations and advice are not enforceable.” 43
The Council of Ministers is another institution within ECOWAS that is comprised of a
minister in charge of ECOWAS affairs and a Minister appointed from each member state.
Previously the Council decided on recommendations for the Authority that would help meet the
obligations and goals of ECOWAS, and then these recommendations would be decided on by the
Authority.
In 1999, ECOWAS also created a Community Court of Justice. This court will hear
complaints from member states and ECOWAS institutions, and concerns of member states
relating to defaulting states. The Court consists of a president, chief registrar and seven judges.
ECOWAS also has a Community Tribunal which interprets the Treaty and handles any disputes
by member states which are referred to it.
The ECOWAS parliament is the largest body of ECOWAS and consists of 115 seats
divided up between all the member states according to population. The parliament acts as an
advisory board with regional executives making referrals of issues to the parliament. The
parliament consists of the plenary, the bureau, the conference of bureau and parliamentary
standing committees.
The ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), also known as The Fund,
supports projects geared toward improving the infrastructure and economic development of West
African states. The Fund also works to increase investment to the region and hopes to become
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the premier finance bank in the region for investment and financing of special projects to
alleviate poverty and generate wealth and development.44
There are also a number of commissions and specialized agencies geared toward
addressing specific problems and initiatives within the region.

ECOWAS Over Time
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Figure 1 ECOWAS Regimes over Time
Democracy defined as +6 or higher in Polity IV data. Autocracy defined as -6 or lower in Polity IV data.
Transition defined as -66,-77, or -88 in Polity IV data.
Source: (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)

At its inception in 1975, ECOWAS was an organization of autocracies, with 13 out of 16
states ranking as established autocracies (-6 or lower on Polity IV).45 This is surprising
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considering the ideals of good governance and democracy under which the organization was
founded. The status of autocracy dominance did not change until a period of instability which
began in 1989, the same time as the Liberian civil war. The entire region was on the crux of
instability which was one of the reasons why the organization felt it necessary to intervene in
Liberia to prevent the entire region from falling into chaos.
However, several states would follow Liberia into civil war and ECOWAS later
intervened in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau following the Liberian intervention. While the
period of instability severely threatened the region, it also spurred a massive transition to
democracy. In only 12 years ECOWAS went from an organization run by a majority of
autocracies to being an organization run by a majority of democracies. The transitions to
democracy continued and in 2011, nine out of 15 states are established democracies, with several
more headed toward democracy. The dominance of democratic governments has allowed the
organization to grow and restructure to try and reach a position of greater power and influence
within the region.
The above chart shows the progression of ECOWAS from an organization dominated by
autocracies to one with a majority membership of democracies. The chart also shows that at the
time of the three major interventions by ECOWAS the organization was dominated by
autocracies. Even the regional hegemon, Nigeria, which was the driving force behind the
Liberian and Sierra Leone interventions, was a firmly established autocracy. 1991 was the
pivotal year for ECOWAS. The number of states in transition spiked as several autocratic states
experienced strong challenges to their authority. Following 1991, the number of autocratic states
continues to decline while democratic states continue to rise. The instability in the region created
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a wave of democracy throughout the region in a desire to bring stability between old
governments and rebel uprisings.
ECOWAS has become one of the most powerful and influential regional organizations in
Africa because of the relative stability of its member states. The SADC is moving toward greater
influence and strength within the region like ECOWAS, but they continue to be held back by
slow economic growth and development.

SADC

SADC Background
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) began in 1980 with several
newly independent southern African states wanting to create their own sub continental regional
entity. They formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in
order to promote regional integration and decrease the dependence on apartheid South Africa.
The original members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A decade later, the organization realized that no progress had
been made. It was not an effective instrument for economic integration due to several
shortcomings within the structure of the organization and the inability to mobilize resources
within the region for development. 46 The SADCC accomplished the creation of a regional
identity, which brought the states together to reorganize the SADCC in 1992.
The Treaty of the Southern African Development Community was different from the
SADCC in four ways: the first was that the mandate now included political and security
46
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concerns, South Africa was allowed to join, and that it was created to be an international body
with a legal persona, and the Treaty and all protocols were meant to be binding on all member
states. The region would have to strengthen itself both economically and politically if it was ever
to become a real influence in the international community. 47
The new SADC placed a great weight upon the necessity of rule of law, democracy,
peace and security, solidarity, human rights and balance and mutual benefit. The new
membership, which now included Namibia and South Africa, were brought together during an
era of change. Several of the region’s countries had moved toward democracy, prompting the
belief that other member states would soon follow. However, the growing instability within the
region and the organization itself would come to a head in the mid-1990s. All the hopes with
which the SADC had been founded were quickly threatened by disagreements over how to
handle the growing number of conflicts within the region.
Following the struggles and division of the 90s, the SADC revised their 1992 treaty in
2001. The most important change to this treaty was the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security
was placed under the control of the Summit, the highest governing body in the SADC.
Previously the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security had been its own entity and deployed
military action and made decisions on behalf of the SADC without consulting the Summit or all
of the SADC members.48 That same year the SADC worked to create a free trade area,
combining efforts with the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market of Eastern
and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 2008. The SADC now consists of Angola, Botswana, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
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Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Seychelles. Madagascar is currently
suspended following the 2009 coup d’état.

SADC Structure
The highest governing body of the SADC is the Summit. The Summit consists of the
heads of state for each member. There is a chairperson and vice chairperson which are rotated
annually among member states. Directly under the Summit is the Council of Ministers. The
Council plays an advisory role to the Summit, oversees the implementation of SADC policies,
and the execution of its programs and the functioning and development of its organization. The
three other main SADC institutions are the Standing Committee of Officials, which offers
technical advice to the Council, the Tribunal, which handles disputes, and the Secretariat. All
SADC institutions are required to make decisions by consensus and quorum for meetings of the
institutions is 2/3 of the member states.
The SADC has protocols on several objectives including peace and security,
infrastructure and services, science and technology and politics, diplomacy and international
relations. The SADC decided to use sectorial co-ordination to achieve its objectives, with
individual states being responsible for the co-ordination of the various sectors. The result proved
to be very inefficient and ineffectual. 49 As of 2001 there were 21 sectorial coordinating unites
and commission in 12 countries.
The only sector that was not placed into the hands of a single state was the sector on
politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security. This was turned into a central
coordinating body which would be chaired by member states on a rotating basis. There were few
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instructions given for how this would be run or what authority was granted to the chair of the
sector. This would eventually become the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-Operation.
The lack of true policy agreement within the SADC have prevented it from being
effective in addressing the number of violations by member states in regards to democracy,
human rights and the rule of law. The different national interests, levels of development and
regimes, caused for significant differences in beliefs over how the SADC and regional security
should be controlled. There are enough consensuses to work together on functional areas but it is
unable to act in a unified or effective manner in terms of regional security. 50
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Democracy rated at +6 or higher Polity IV score. Autocracy rated as -6 or below Polity IV score. Transition
rated at -66,-77, or -88 Polity IV score. Madagascar included for 2005-2009. Seychelles is excluded for lack of
Polity IV data, but the country is understood to be relatively democratic.
Source:(Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)

The Southern African Development Community was formed during a period where many
of the states were moving toward democracy and autocracy was on the decline. However, the
SADC still struggles to have a majority democratic membership even in 2011. Many states
remain in transition, and Swaziland remains a strongly autocratic regime despite the values of the
organization.
However, the focus of the SADC has not been as much on the political and peacekeeping
needs of the region. Instead, the modern focus of the SADC has been on the economic needs and
development of the region, believing that development will bring forth the democracy and
stability that the organization supports. New partnerships to create free trade zones and build a
strong economic and investment sector within the region have been the main objectives.
The SADC has taken steps against Madagascar following the 2009 coup d’état. They
have not only suspended the state from the SADC, but they have attempted to intervene with
peacekeeping forces. The SADC has been the most successful in the past in terms of
peacekeeping. There were struggles in both Lesotho and the DRC, with the different states
within the SADC not able to work together or agree on appropriate actions in these two
interventions.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ECOWAS AND THE LIBERIAN CRISIS

Background to the Liberian Crisis
The Liberian crisis stemmed from the very beginning of Liberia’s history. Liberia was
founded as a place for freed slaves from the United States to start a new life on their own in
Africa. There were several freed slaves who decided to start over in Liberia and they created a
new government that placed them in control. The Americo-Liberians allowed themselves to have
complete control over the wealth and power in Liberia, even though they made up only 5% of the
population. The rest of the population consisted of the people that were indigenous to the area. 51
There are 16 major groups of indigenous Liberians and 31 different languages spoken
within the country. By 1971 4% of the population controlled 60% of the country’s income, and
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that 4% were all Americo-Liberians. 52 On April 12th 1980, the repression of the indigenous
Liberians came to a head when Samuel Doe led a successful military coup against the AmericoLiberian government. As a member of the Krahn ethnic group, the people of Liberia hoped that
he was their answer to years of repression. 53
However, Samuel Doe found that at 26 years of age, it was hard to maintain the respect
and authority needed to govern a country and make the necessary changes for a more egalitarian
society and government. It was not long before it was clear that Doe’s government simply placed
a new ethnic group in power. Government repression and corruption were common and Doe
made sure to give government and military positions to members of his Krahn ethnic group. By
1985, there was no free speech and no political parties allowed. All political opponents to Doe
and his government faced death or imprisonment. 54
In 1989, a rebellion led by Charles Taylor moved against Doe’s government. Calling
themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) they spurred the first Liberian war.
They started their campaign in Nimba and Doe responded by attacking Nimba and killing
civilians. Doe’s response caused many to side with Taylor and his forces quickly grew. Within
months, Taylor’s forces controlled large portions of Liberia and were ready to move on the
capital. President Doe appealed to neighboring countries for help against the insurrection and
received support from Nigeria. Taylor on the other hand, received support from Cote d’Ivoire
and Burkina Faso.
Both sides used ethnic rivalries to increase the tensions. President Doe killed Gio and
Mano groups and Taylor killed Krahns and Mandingos. Both sides attacked and killed civilians
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with little mercy, causing the war to receive international attention. However, the United States
was occupied with the Gulf War and the rest of the international community felt that there should
be an African initiative to stop the bloodshed. 55 With a lack of response from the international
community, ECOWAS members decided that it was time to step in.

Reasons for ECOWAS Intervention
The intervention of ECOWAS into the Liberian crisis was unique and unexpected on a
number of fronts. This intervention was the first time that an economic regional organization
intervened militarily in an internal crisis. Another surprising factor was that many ECOWAS
governments were unstable and feared their own coups and insurrections. Within the years of the
Liberian crisis, six out of sixteen ECOWAS governments would experience periods of transition
or interregnum (scores of -88 and -77 on Polity IV) and only 3 were considered stable
democracies.56 When the organization decided to intervene there were more autocracies than
democracies and yet there was still an initiative to promote democracy within Liberia.
Despite the lack of a democratic majority within ECOWAS, the organization still took
the initiative to promote democracy. Pevehouse suggests that democracies want to promote other
democracies because it lends legitimacy to their own regime, but there is no suggestion of the
reasons why an autocracy would want to push another state toward democracy. In the case of
ECOWAS, there is significant evidence that the reasons for intervention in Liberia were due to
individual state interests, rather than an organizational initiative to promote democracy. While
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democracy in Liberia eventually became the goal of many states within ECOWAS and of
ECOWAS itself, a transition to democracy was never a main initiative in intervention.
The major force behind the intervention in Liberia was Nigeria which was expected for a
number of reasons. Nigeria was the richest country in ECOWAS and it had previous experience
working with UN peacekeeping missions. Nigeria also had the most advanced military and the
resources to spare in order to intervene in Liberia.57 When it came time to send troops and
money, Nigeria sent more than all the other ECOWAS countries combined. Despite the expected
reasons for why Nigeria would be the lead on any intervention performed by ECOWAS,
Nigerian leaders had their own reasons for intervening.
The Nigerian government wanted to prove itself as the regional hegemon both to
ECOWAS and to the rest of the international community. Promoting stability and ending the
bloodshed were the reasons that Nigerian leaders used when convincing ECOWAS to intervene
in Liberia in order to end the war and restore stability. The focus was always on stability and
never on the necessity of promoting democracy. It later became the opinion of many states,
including Nigeria, that democracy in Liberia was the most likely way to create stability between
the government and the rebel groups.
There was also a need for retaliation in response to the murder of hundreds of civilians as
they hid in the Nigerian embassy. At the outbreak of the war there were more than 70,000
Nigerians living and working in Liberia.58 When the Nigerian president Ibrahim Babangida
answered President Doe’s request for assistance, the Nigerians living in Liberia became targets
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of Taylor’s National Patriotic Front for the Liberia (NPFL). On August 8, 1990, the NPFL
attacked the Nigerian embassy, solidifying Nigeria’s need to intervene.
President Ibrahim Babangida also saw an opportunity to gain allies because of the threat
of regional instability. The countries of Gambia, Sierra Leone and Guinea were close to Liberia
and were not only receiving refugees but also had members of their populations join Taylor’s
forces. There was a growing fear that the civil war in Liberia would spread to these neighboring
countries. 59 President Babangida needed their support to help against the growing criticisms of
the international community on the human rights abuses and political repression in Nigeria.60
Nigeria was under fire for the problems within its own state, so they hoped that making a good
show in Liberia and having the support of neighboring states would allow the international
community to continue supporting Nigeria.
Ghana also supported intervention in Liberia for two reasons, like Nigeria there was
concern for the 10,000 Ghanaians living in Liberia at the time of the war.61 There was also the
growing concern over the number of Liberians that were seeking refuge within Ghana. The
Foreign Minister of Ghana maintained that the ECOWAS intervention should only be performed
if it was for the good of the membership of ECOWAS. He maintained that the thousands of
Ghanaians, Nigerians and other nationals that were suffering in Liberia due to the war, were the
sole reason why ECOWAS needed to intervene. 62 Ghana proved to be the only country that
contributed troops that had no direct political benefits to gain from the outcome of the war.

59

(Mays, 1998, p. 114)
(Brown, 1999, p. 13)
61
(Brown, 1999, p. 19)
62
(Adibe, 1997, p. 474)
60

39

Guinea and Sierra Leone were the first countries to band together with Nigeria in support
of intervention. Both countries had been the recipients of thousands of refugees and worried
about their internal stability. Guinea and Sierra Leone maintained that intervention was
necessary to ensure not only stability within Liberia but stability within their own states.63
Mali and Togo were not directly affected by the crisis in Liberia and were therefore wary
of providing troops toward a peacekeeping mission. 64 Neither Togo nor Mali opposed
intervention outright but were not willing to send troops. In 1991, a change of government in
Mali caused a change of heart as the new President Alpha Omar Konare was an advocate for
regional peace and stability. He also hoped to maintain stability within his own country by
sending away the troops that were supporters of the previous regime to Liberia. 65
There was also strong opposition to invention in Liberia but in some cases the opposition
was overpowered by the voice of Nigeria, and in others the leaders of the opposing states
changed their minds. Both Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire believed that intervention by
ECOWAS would be an over extension of its mandate, citing the Organization of Africa Unity
(OAU) charter and the ECOWAS Treaty on state sovereignty. However, privately it was known
that Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire supported the Taylor regime. 66 President Compaore of
Burkina Faso eventually changed his position when he prepared to be chairman of the OAU. He
knew that as leader of an organization that promoted peace, he could not support the violent
rebellion in Liberia.
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Niger and Senegal were also wary of intervention in Liberia and turned their attention
elsewhere at the onset of the intervention. Niger was experiencing internal unrest and therefore
could not spare any troops for Liberia. That would change when, like Mali, the new President
Ibrahim Bare used the Liberian crisis as a way to move potentially threatening troops out of the
country.67 Senegal would change its position under pressure from both the United States and
Taylor. The United States could not spare the resources to intervene during the Gulf War, but
offered to provide financial support for any peacekeeping mission by Senegal in Liberia. 68
Taylor believed that Senegal would help make the intervention more neutral, as he did not trust
the Nigerian dominated force.69 The first troops from Senegal arrived in October 1991 and
Niger’s troops arrived in 1997.
Zaire and Ethiopia supported the intervention on the hopes that this would keep the
United Nations from intervening in the situation. Zaire and Ethiopia were under pressure from
Nigeria to support the mission. Both countries also feared that UN involvement in Liberia would
set a dangerous precedent if their own unstable regimes should come under attack.70 Thus, the
majority of countries that supported the intervention in Liberia did so because of instability
within their own states and instability within the region. The importance of domestic stability
and regional stability differed for each member state. For the states that chose to send troops to
Liberia as a method of removing potential dissidents from the country, domestic stability was the
main concern. For states like Nigeria with a strong autocracy, the greater concern was stability
for the region. There was very little true humanitarian focus, but rather a focus upon what Liberia
would mean for the tenuous control the other leaders had over their states.
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The process of ECOWAS intervention began in 1990 when pressure from Sierra Leone
and Guinea to intervene led to the creation of a Standing Mediation Committee. The committee
consisted of representatives from Guinea, the Gambia, Mali, Nigeria and Togo who were tasked
with finding a peaceful solution to the crisis. The Standing Mediation Committee attempted to
arrange a peace agreement but was daunted by the refusal of Doe to step down and Taylor’s
factions were not interested in negotiating for peace. The SMC also imposed travel restrictions,
froze assets, and restricted the use of sovereign territories by the rebel forces, but these methods
failed to bring about a peace agreement. In July 1990, despite some opposition, the ECOWAS
Defense committee created a plan for military intervention in Liberia.
The intervention was justified based upon the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense
which was adopted by ECOWAS in 1981. This protocol allows ECOWAS to intervene in any
internal armed conflict within a member state if the conflict is likely to endanger the peace and
security of the region. The protocol allowed for a community army of troops to be formed from
national units in order to militarily intervene in an internal situation. General Erskine of
ECOWAS stated that “with the crisis in Liberia creating unbearable refugee problems for Sierra
Leone, Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire, it is obvious that the situation in
Liberia has gone beyond the boundaries of the country and ceases to be an exclusive Liberian
question.”71
The Monitoring Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOMOG) was deployed in Liberia in August of 1990. Their mission was to include the
imposition of a ceasefire, the disarmament of the warring parties, end the violence, impose an
embargo on the acquisition and import of guns, establish an interim government and prepare for
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elections and the evacuation of all foreign nationals. 72 The entrance of ECOMOG into the
country escalated the violence and the conflict.

ECOMOG in Liberia
The ECOMOG forces were composed of 3,500 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea,
Sierra Leone and the Gambia. The forces were led by Lt. General A. Quainoo of Ghana in an
attempt by Nigeria to show that they were not trying to dominate the ECOMOG force. 73 Upon
landing in Liberia, ECOMOG forces quickly took control of the capital of Monrovia. At this
point the NPFL had splintered and a new rebel group, the INPFL (Independent National Patriotic
Front of Liberia), formed causing Charles Taylor to have a war on two fronts. Along with the
INPFL, Taylor also had to contend with the leftover forces from the dissolved Armed Forces of
Liberia (AFL). The government’s standing army continued to fight on behalf of Doe and the
government, even after Doe was no longer in power. However, that did not stop Taylor from not
only increasing the violence upon the arrival of ECOMOG but attacking the observer group as
well. ECOMOG was forced to go on the offensive to protect themselves and Monrovia. The use
of force by ECOMOG against the NPFL changed the purpose of ECOMOG from a peacekeeping
force to a peace enforcement force. 74
The first major problem for ECOMOG came in November 1990 when INPFL forces
broke through the ECOMOG containment and kidnapped President Doe. The leader of the
INPFL, Prince Johnson, filmed the torture and murder of the Liberian president. This
embarrassment caused Lt. General Quainoo to be replaced by a more experienced Nigerian
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leader, and it would be Nigerian leaders that would control ECOMOG for the rest of the
intervention. The event also spurred ECOMOG into action and an interim government was
quickly set up in Monrovia. The government was disputed by Taylor who argued that it would
not be legitimate since NPFL forces controlled the majority of the country, and the NPFL was
not a part of the new government.
ECOMOG was eventually backed into a corner of increasing their military capacity and
going on the offensive against the INPFL and the NPFL in order to protect the capital and the
new government. The problems that ECOMOG faced were compounded as the rebel groups
continued to splinter and new ones entered the country. In June of 1991, the United Liberation
Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) entered the country and began attacking NPFL
forces. This group was formed from former Doe supporters and members of the Liberian army
who had fled the country. This group would eventually split like the NPFL into two separate
factions the ULIMO-K (led by Kromah) and the ULIMO-J (Led by Roosevelt Johnson). The
AFL was also known to fight along with ULIMO forces as they often had the same objectives.
With several active fronts within the country and each rebel group unclear about what it was they
wanted in a new government, few of the peace agreements forged by ECOMOG were successful.
ECOMOG itself struggled to maintain control in Liberia and follow through on the
mandate it was given. However, there was no direct link between the ECOMOG forces and there
were few political directives given to the forces from ECOWAS. There was not even a
mechanism in place to hold ECOMOG accountable to ECOWAS, so the force commanders
controlled the military and the political aspects of the operation. 75 There was not even an
ambassadorial group to help forge the peace agreements. The forces were also too small to
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maintain firm control over the region and move beyond Monrovia. They suffered from a lack of
funds and a lack of direction that prevented them from being successful in Liberia from the start.
However, ECOMOG did provide a sense of stability within the capital and opened the doors to
peace agreements.
In 1992 the NPFL was losing territory to the ULIMO forces and decided to stage an
attack on ECOWAS. Taylor’s goal was to either defeat ECOMOG or cause enough damage for
them to leave Liberia. Operation Octopus was a full scale attack by the NPFL on Monrovia and it
caught ECOMOG completely off guard. It was nearly a week before ECOMOG responded by
bombing NPFL targets, ULIMO forces and former members of the Liberian army came to the
aid of ECOMOG. 76 By the time a ceasefire was called, about 3,000 lives had been lost in the
attack and ECOMOG’s neutrality was called into question.
Not only did the NPFL continue to doubt the neutrality of ECOMOG but the international
community did as well. Former President Jimmy Carter of the United States questioned the size
of ECOMOG, its neutrality and the number of arms under its control. 77 Within ECOWAS,
Burkina Faso spoke out against the continued attacks of ECOMOG against the NPFL. ECOWAS
formed a Committee of Nine, consisting of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo to monitor the implementation of the peace
agreements. The Committee decided that ECOMOG had the right to defend itself against
continued attacks from the NPFL but that there would be a ceasefire on the 10th of November
1992. The Committee also invited a representative from the United Nations to aid the peace
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process. The decision by the committee was a compromise between the Francophone countries
that wanted to mediate the crisis and the Anglophone countries that wanted a military response. 78
In 1993, the Contonu Peace Agreement was forged in Monrovia, setting up a coalition
government between the interim government set up by ECOMOG, the NPFL and Doe’s
remaining supporters. In order to enforce the agreement, ECOWAS called upon the help of the
United Nations to enforce and monitor the conditions of the peace agreement. The United
Nations deployed the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), a group of over
300 observers who would be under the protection of ECOMOG.
The enforcement of the Contonu Peace Agreement was slow as the rebel factions were
not fully committed to the agreement. The matter was further complicated by the influx of two
new groups, the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) led by George Boley and the Lofa Defense Force
(LDF). Neither of these groups had signed the Contonu Peace Agreement and they moved on
NPFL forces, causing Taylor to be reluctant to comply with the peace agreement. ECOMOG and
UNOMIL attempted to forge new peace agreements but the situation had deteriorated into one of
warlords simply looking to add territory to their own claims of power.
After renewed struggle, the ECOWAS chairman Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings
called the leaders of the three main rebel groups in Liberia to Akosombo. The negotiations
included Taylor of the NPFL, Kromah of the ULIMO-K, and General Bowen of the AFL. The
peace agreement set up a new power sharing government between the warlords, which appeased
those in attendance. However, several factions were not represented and continued fighting,
including taking over the territories of the factions who did attend the peace talks.
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Peace talks were restarted once again in Abuja and this time all the factions were
represented. The war weary factions were losing ground and their forces were ready to end the
fighting. The new peace agreement set up another power sharing arrangement between the
warring factions with the intent to set up elections in August of 1996. However, this plan failed
when fighting once again broke out between factions of the UNLIMO-J. ECOMOG troops and
the interim government subdued the fighting and the elections were scheduled for May 1997.
During this time ECOWAS sought out the help of the international community with the
rebuilding and the restructuring of the Liberian government and infrastructure. The United States
decided that it would help with the process despite its displeasure at the state of domestic politics
within the military regime of Nigeria. The European Union also pledged its support to the Abuja
peace agreement and offered support to ECOMOG. The support and the additional funding and
troops for ECOMOG allowed the disarmament to begin and for there to be enough forces to
create real stability within the state.
Charles Taylor pushed a strong campaign for the 1997 elections and he was the most
well-known candidate in Liberia. He gained large support, to the surprise of many. One political
saying was “He killed my ma, he killed my pa, still I will vote for him.” 79 ECOWAS supported
Charles Taylor for President of Liberia because they felt that was the only way to ensure that
there would be no more fighting and the ECOMOG troops could pull out. 80 The international
community however feared that with Taylor in power, there would not be a liberal democracy.
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The elections were held in May 1997 as planned, and both ECOWAS and UN observers found
the elections to be free, fair and transparent. 81
The international community called upon ECOWAS to continue to work toward
rebuilding and restructuring Liberia. The organization was tired of the war and was eager to
bring their troops home, but the success of the elections led them to commit to leaving troops for
another six months. While publically ECOWAS promised that the rebuilding of Liberia was the
goal of the new government, privately ECOWAS believed that it would be up to other members
of the international community to help Liberia move forward.82
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Liberia faced a rocky beginning following the election of President Taylor. For several
years, Taylor ruled with an iron fist that was similar to that of President Doe. He was known for
human rights abuses and filling the government with only his key supporters. 83 In 1998, he
ejected ECOMOG from the country and refused their involvement in Liberia. This changed
when more rebel factions entered Liberia in 1999 and 2002. These factions quickly took control
of the country and put Taylor on the defensive. Once again ECOWAS troops with the help of the
UN intervened and a new peace agreement was in place in 2003. In October of 2003, the UN
took over the peacekeeping operations from ECOWAS, but continued to use ECOWAS troops.
By 2005 another round of free and fair elections took place. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was
elected and has since tried to lead Liberia down a path of peace and stability.
Prior to the intervention of ECOWAS, Liberia had a Polity rating of -6.84 Even though
President Doe took over the government with the promise of creating an equal and democratic
Liberia, what really happened was far from it. In 1983, copies of the new draft constitution were
everywhere as Liberians were asked to read it and relay any concerns. 85 Posters were found in
every town asking the citizens to do their duty as Liberians and improved the new Liberian
constitution. There was hope within Liberia and the international community that a true move
toward democracy was on the horizon.
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But as Doe moved to consolidate power he killed many of his rivals and sent several
others fleeing into exile, including Prince Johnson and Charles Taylor, future leaders of the
NPFL. The United States and other allies convinced Doe that moving to civilian rule would be
the best way for him to stay in power, by doing the same that other military dictators in Africa
had done.86 To this end, Doe formed his own political party and used all the government
resources at his disposal to recruit supporters to stand against any who opposed him. His support
was limited to the few he had put into power, his tough and brutal tactics had lost him the
support he had gained at the start of his military rule. 87
The 1985 presidential election was blatantly rigged and there was little dispute by any
observers of that fact.88 His unpopularity within Liberia forced Doe to claim that he had won
only 50.9 percent of the vote, a low number for an election that was so obviously rigged.
However, the United States chose to recognize the election as legitimate and that Doe was now
the rightful President of Liberia. This move by the United States was strategic as the Cold War
continued; Liberia was a strong foothold for the United States and the Central Intelligence
Agency. It was necessary to keep ties strong, which meant that no matter what offenses Doe
committed or promises he broke, he continued to have the support and aid of the United States.89
A month after the elections, Quiwonkpa, a former supporter and friend of Doe who
helped with the 1980 coup, returned to Liberia after being scared into exile. He entered through
Nimba County with the hope of pulling off another successful coup attempt. 90 There was
widespread jubilation at Quiwonkpa’s entrance into Monrovia, but Doe was prepared. The
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United States had already informed him of the pending coup, allowing Doe to summon enough
troops to defeat Quiwonkpa and his soldiers. 91 The coup attempt caused Doe to go on a brutal
rampage against any who were thought to be supporters of Quiwonkpa; including residents of
Nimba County, those that cheered at Quiwonkpa’s arrival and anyone with any suspected tie to
the rebel force. An estimated 1,500 people lost their lives in the aftermath. 92
There was no restraint on Doe’s power. Even as the United States realized that Doe was
squandering the aid that was being sent to Liberia, there was little that could be done to stop him.
The United States even sent a team of accountants to try and keep track of the money, but Doe
was able to easily outsmart them. By 1986, the country was spiraling downward. A report by the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights found that brutality, executions, political detentions and
abuse of free speech were the cornerstones of the Doe regime.93 Teachers went on strike and
members of the army grew largely unhappy as their salaries were withheld for months and up to
80% of their income was taken as taxes to the government. Political detentions without due
process became common as students, journalists, teachers and any opposition figures were jailed
with no word on the chance of release. 94
The lack of restraint on the executive and the lack of civil liberties placed the Doe regime
as a firm autocracy. When Charles Taylor was elected president in 1997 in elections that were
widely considered free and fair by a number of international observers, ironically it brought a
new era of repression for Liberia rather than democracy. By 1998, there was widespread fear
throughout Liberia as Taylor went on a rampage against anyone associated with his old rival
Roosevelt Johnson. Government road blocks were set up to capture anyone of the same ethnic
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group as Johnson. 95 Counselor Tiawan Gongloe was a human rights lawyer in Liberia in 2002
when he spoke out against Taylor’s government. Taylor responded by having him brutally
tortured.96 Taylor also gained international condemnation when he jailed four journalists working
for Britain’s Channel 4 news. The journalists were working on a widely known story of Taylor
trading diamonds from rebels in Sierra Leone for weapons. 97 In 2012, Charles Taylor was
convicted of war crimes for supporting the brutality of the rebel troops in Sierra Leone; he was
given a sentence of 50 years.98
UN and ECOWAS peacekeepers returned to Liberia in 2005 to bring stability to the
region after insurgents entered the country once again causing Taylor to flee to Nigeria. By 2006,
the country went through another round of free and fair elections. Liberia elected the first female
African president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Taylor’s major competitor in the 1997 elections.
President Sirleaf has been re-elected in subsequent free and fair elections and Liberia is now
considered to be an established democracy.
Under Sirleaf foreign debt has nearly been eliminated and the country reports annual
growth rates of 6.5%.99 However, there have been some concerns over nepotism and corruption
as Sirleaf appointed three of her sons to top positions in the government. While Sirleaf admitted
that corruption was rife within her country, the appointments she made were on the basis of
merit.100 There were also concerns of land deals made to outside investors, where land was taken
from the community and granted to foreign companies. Some reports say that Sirleaf’s
government turned over more than a third of Liberia’s land. The Sirleaf government has
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promised to stop all public land sales and look into the issue, promising that any unfair deals
would have the land returned to the community. 101
While there have been a number of problems within the Sirleaf government, they have
been minor compared to the brutality and repression of the past. A 2009 human rights report
found that there was still violence in Liberia, poor prison conditions, reports of detention without
due process, and government restriction of the press. There have been no reports of politically
motivated killings and any incidences where the military or army has participated in an unjust
killing have led to arrests. There have been no politically motivated disappearances, and torture
by the government has been outlawed by the constitution. There have been some reports of
military and police using torture, and trial by ordeal continues to exist in rural areas. 102
Liberia has a long way to go to be truly peaceful and stable, but in just a few years Sirleaf
has done a great deal of work in healing the wounds created by decades of conflict.

Other ECOWAS Interventions
The fear that Liberia would cause instability within the region was not unfounded as in
the following years ECOWAS would intervene in both Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. The
intervention in Sierra Leone was much like the intervention into Liberia with Nigeria taking the
lead and ECOMOG being rife with logistical and financial problems. When Nigeria moved from
an autocracy to a civilian democratic government it could no longer play a major military role in
ECOWAS peacekeeping efforts. It pulled out of Sierra Leone, leaving the rest of the process to
the UN, and did not provide troops for the intervention into Guinea-Bissau. These two
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interventions had very different results, largely due to the decreased presence of Nigeria
following its own regime change.

Sierra Leone
The Sierra Leone war occurred partly as an outgrowth of the Liberian crisis. Disaffected
youths in Sierra Leone formed the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and were joined by rebels
from Charles Taylor’s NPFL in March of 1991. The reason for the support of the NPFL was that
Taylor warned that Sierra Leone would experience their own “taste of war” for their support of
ECOMOG in Liberia.103 Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea all sent troops to help the government fend
off the rebels in fulfillment of a mutual defense pacts that had been signed.
The poorly trained and poorly equipped Sierra Leone army could not defend against the
rebels and a military coup occurred in April 1992, under the leadership of a former ECOMOG
soldier. 104 The formation of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) put the country
under relatively stable if corrupt governance. The NPRC drastically increased the army, even
hiring soldiers from South Africa to fight and push out most of the RUF in 1995.105
In January of 1996 another coup, led by Julius Maada Bio ousted the NPRC. Bio staged
the coup after speaking with Nigerian officials and learning that Nigerian troops would not stand
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in the way of the coup. International pressure caused Bio to hold democratic elections in Sierra
Leone, and in March Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected.106
In 1997 elements of the Sierra Leone Army, led by Johnny Paul Kromah, rose up against
Kabbah. Following the coup against a democratically elected government, the Nigerian chairman
of ECOWAS, sought diplomatic measures to force the military junta to step down and for the
democratic government to be returned to power. The international community refused to
recognize the military junta and continued to view Kabbah as the rightful leader of Sierra Leone.
Kromah refused to work with ECOWAS in July 1997, stating that he would not be forced
back into a civilian government. In August 1997, ECOWAS ministers recommended that the
troops from ECOWAS countries within Sierra Leone be referred to as ECOMOG II. The talks
between ECOWAS and Kromah were criticized for being unilateral, with Nigeria not consulting
other members of ECOWAS about the negotiations.
The conflict came to a head when Nigerian troops in the capital attacked the military
junta in February 1998.While the initiative led to Kabbah being returned to power in March
1998, the unilateral action by Nigeria was frowned upon by some members of ECOWAS and the
UN. However, Nigeria supplied about 90 percent of the troops in Sierra Leone with small
numbers of troops coming from Ghana, Guinea and Mali. Benin, Gambia, Cote d’Ivoire, and
Niger all promised troops to the mission but they never arrived. Therefore, even though Nigeria
continued to be seen as a bully hegemon with the Sierra Leone intervention, as they did in
Liberia there were few others willing to put forces and finances toward the mission.
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Many of the same problems that plagued ECOMOG in Liberia continued in Sierra Leone.
There were few operational and logistical mechanisms for the peacekeeping forces; there were
not even enough bilingual officers to effectively run the entire force. There were ill feelings
toward Nigerian dominance that caused divisions within ECOWAS which prevented the
peacekeeping force from having the full support of the organization. Nigeria would often push
aside the attempts of other states to take leadership roles within the intervention or the diplomatic
proceedings, causing anger and distrust for the hegemon.
Nigeria had several reasons for wanting to be a major force in Sierra Leone. The
intervention allowed Nigeria to put off substantial sanctions against its own regime. The
international community had been threatening severe sanctions against Nigeria for human rights
abuses and for the repressive regime. One of the reasons why Nigeria did not stop the coup
attempt by Bio was because the leader of the NPRC had voted to censure Nigeria at the
Commonwealth summing in Auckland. The censure vote was in response to the hanging of nine
environmental activists by the Nigerian regime. The continued international efforts of Nigeria
acted as a sleight of hand trick, where the international community would look toward the
intervention efforts of Nigeria and ignore the actions of the repressive regime.
In turn, Nigeria also wanted to restore democracy to Sierra Leone as a way to bolster the
image of Nigeria and to gain with the international community. 107 The intervention into Sierra
Leone was also another step in Nigeria’s quest to be seen as a regional hegemon. There were also
personal reasons for the intervention, as corrupt generals and even Abacha himself was able to
redirect millions of dollars into private funds while billing them as ECOMOG expenses. 108
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Another invasion by RUF occurred in January 1999, and Nigerian troops were once again
forced to fight back to bring stability to Sierra Leone. However, the Nigerian forces received
strong criticism for using their own brutal methods against the rebels. A ceasefire was signed in
May 1999, and called for disarmament and for the RUF to become a political party. The
agreement allowed for the new government to be split being the warring factions and would be
overseen by the UN, the OAU, the Commonwealth and Togo. The agreement was far from ideal
but it was becoming clear that Nigeria was no longer willing to commit troops.
In August 1999, Nigerian President Obasanjo (elected in May 1999 in democratic
elections) wrote to the UN, stating that Nigeria would be pulling troops out of Sierra Leone. The
new democratic, civilian government had too many internal problems to continue the estimated
U.S. $1 million a day mission in Sierra Leone. The UN reluctantly took over the ceasefire and
found the task daunting as several of the UN’s own managerial problems prevented a proper
response. In 2000, ECOWAS agreed to send 3,000 troops to help the UN forces. Disarmament
was completed in 2002, and parliamentary and presidential elections occurred that same year,
with Kabbah being re-elected president. Another round of elections occurred in 2007, and Sierra
Leone currently has a Polity IV score of 7. 109

Guinea Bissau
The intervention into Guinea-Bissau was unique for ECOWAS in that it was the first
intervention that did not include Nigeria in a leadership role. The hegemon was still struggling to
overcome internal issues with its fledging civilian government. Nigeria also refused to be a
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major financial or military backer for the intervention, which left the entire operation to other
ECOWAS states for the first time.110
The conflict in Guinea-Bissau began in 1998 when President Joao Bernardo Vieira
accused his army chief of staff, General Ansumane Mane of providing arms to secessionists in
Senegal. Mane denied the charges and was not only replaced but Vieira attempted to have him
arrested.111 A report was released in April 1999 that not only exonerated Mane, but implicated
Vieira as the one trafficking arms. 112
Mane’s treatment led to a coup attempt and the establishment of a military junta. Mane
was very popular among the army as he always fought for better conditions for his men and for
Vieira to pay their delayed salaries. 113 Mane’s popularity meant that most of the army defected
and joined Mane’s rebellion, forcing Vieira to hire young men to fight on his side, sometimes
even underage boys. Both Senegal and Guinea intervened militarily on the side of Vieira, and
Vieira was urged to seek ECOWAS support.114
ECOWAS support came immediately with Vieira’s request. This was due largely to the
lack of a Nigerian dominance in the intervention, but also because there was strong camaraderie
between Senegal, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau and other ECOWAS heads of state. This is in
contrast to the Liberian intervention where Samuel Doe was not well liked by the other
ECOWAS heads of state. By October 1998, a Committee of Nine was established to address the
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situation in Guinea-Bissau. Nigeria refused to contribute troops despite Vieira personally
requesting Nigerian assistance because Nigeria’s resources were already overstretched. 115
Nigeria did play host to a peace accord and the Abuja agreement was brokered in
November 1998. Despite the peace agreement and preparations to deploy peacekeeping
observers to Guinea-Bissau, fighting once again broke out in January 1999. 116Problems with
communication, logistics and finances once again created delays and problems for the ECOMOG
forces. Once ECOMOG arrived in Guinea-Bissau they were shackled with poor equipment.
Vehicles were constantly breaking down and there was a lack of radios which meant that troops
could not patrol very far from headquarters.117
Problems continued as Vieira refused to abide by the terms of the ceasefire, causing
Mane to rally his troops to fight against Vieira again in May 1999. ECOMOG troops did nothing
to stop this round of fighting, allowing Mane to take control and force Vieira out of the country.
Soon after ECOWAS condemned the coup but stated that ECOMOG would withdraw from
Guinea-Bissau in early June 1999. This was due to the deteriorating situation in Guinea-Bissau
and the financial and logistical problems that ECOMOG was experiencing. 118
Elections were held in November of 1999, electing President Kumba Yala. September
2003 saw another military coup and a round of legislative elections occurred in 2004. 119 This was
followed by military mutiny and another round of presidential elections in 2005. 120 This time
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President Vieira was re-elected and served until his assassination in March 2009. 121 In June of
2009 the military allowed for another election to be held this time with Malam Bacai Sanhá
winning the presidency. April 2012 saw another military coup and continued instability. 122

Conclusion
The Liberian intervention showed that Nigeria was necessary as a major player in
ECOWAS affairs, despite the anger of Nigerian dominance in other member states. Nigeria’s
wealth and troops were needed to have any chance of bring stability to Liberia, as well as Sierra
Leone. When it was clear that Nigeria would no longer be a financial and military backer for
Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS mission backed down in favor of UN involvement. The ECOWAS
mission in Guinea-Bissau was rife with problems from lack of adequate troops to the inability to
properly finance the mission and give ECOMOG the tools it needed. Comparing the outcomes of
the interventions with and without the presence of the regional hegemon of Nigeria it is certain
that a regional hegemon or help from an outside power (either a state or international
organization) is necessary to provide the necessary resources for the interventions to be
successful.
Another interesting development was that only as an autocracy was Nigeria willing to
expand significant numbers of troops and substantial financial support for the ECOWAS
interventions. Once they moved to a democracy it was clear that Nigerian troops and funds were
needed to help stabilize Nigeria and solve the problems at home. What was clear about the Sierra
Leone mission and in part the Liberian mission was that the Nigerian initiative to create stable
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democracies was based on a desire to improve the international standing of Nigeria. As an
autocracy, Nigeria was guilty of several human rights abuses and repression of her own people,
by turning the attention of the international community toward the successful democratic and
peacekeeping efforts of Nigeria; it delayed the inevitable sanctions and pressures for reform.
The ECOWAS interventions also had strong member cohesiveness with all members of
ECOWAS aware of the interventions before they occurred. There was discussion and debate for
the best course of action in all of the interventions and there was majority support for the
interventions. This policy agreement whether through national interests or a common goal for the
region and the organization, helped to provide a strong and unified front for the ECOWAS
interventions. It also paved the way for the interventions to get support from organizations like
the UN when it was needed.
It is also of note that democracy was never the main initiative in any of the interventions.
They were driven by national interest and the desire to maintain stability in the region.
Democracy only came as an outcropping of the desire for stability, with power sharing and
democratic regimes being the only chance at bringing peace to states torn by conflict. In Liberia,
few thought that Charles Taylor would be an effective leader, but the belief among Liberians and
ECOWAS was that Taylor winning the election was the best chance at stability. It was a
commonly held belief that if Charles Taylor did not win, the NPFL would continue fighting in
Liberia. Therefore, the focus was not on the rule of law, on the electoral process or even human
rights to an extent, the focus was on bringing stability to Liberia and to the region. Democracy
was just seen as the best pathway to that desired stability.
The problems with the ECOWAS efforts to bring stability and democracy to states in
crisis was not that the interventions were driven by individual national interests, but that there
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were no mechanisms in place for such initiatives. The strong and clearly defined institutions did
not exist in any of the case studies and this deficit caused problems throughout all three
interventions. In all three ECOMOG operations there was no clear line of authority for the troops
and no strategic or logistic efforts in place by ECOWAS. All military decisions were made by
whichever state was leading the intervention, and it was clear that Nigeria was one of the few
states that had the experience and the means to run the large intervention forces. However,
Nigerian forces were also very corrupt and were not easy to trust, as was evidenced by Nigerian
generals stealing from ECOWAS funds and billing the missing money as ECOMOG expenses.
While this lack of strong and clearly defined institutions did not prevent the intervention from
bringing eventual stability and democracy to Liberia, eventually the help of the UN was needed
to solve the problems that were left by the lack of structure within ECOWAS.
There are three very important lessons to be taken from the interventions by ECOWAS.
The first was that they were poorly planned and poorly implemented. The second was that while
they were messy and may have been the cause of conflict rather than the solution, they were able
to bring a sense of stability to conflict ridden areas when the rest of the international community
was unwilling to intervene. The final lesson is that with many ECOWAS states still struggling to
build their economies and their military, it is necessary for a strong hegemon like Nigeria to be
involved in peacekeeping missions. Therefore, a regional hegemon proved to be essential to the
success of ECOWAS interventions and a strong hegemon helped to fill the gap that was left by
the lack of strong institutions.
Today ECOWAS has revamped their institutions and created a new structure for many of
their operations. Several states are also on the road to becoming stronger states with the ability to
have a larger role in peacekeeping interventions, but a strong hegemon will still be necessary for
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interventions to really be able to bring stability. The difference in ECOMOG force size with and
without the aid of Nigeria was thousands, and the equipment supplied to the Nigerian backed
interventions was essential to providing stability to capitals and states in crisis.
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CHAPTER SIX: SADC INTERVENTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Background to the DRC Conflict
The crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was the culmination of years of
conflict and strife leading all the way back to its brutal colonial roots. The DRC was colonized
originally as the personal property of King Leopold and he exploited the people and resources of
the DRC with extreme brutality. When independence was granted to the Congo, its people had
had no real access to education or the ability to run their own government; there was no
preparation for independence at all. 123
This led to a power struggle within the country. The elected Prime Minister Patrice
Lumumba had to seek help from the UN to secure his borders and bring stability to the country
that had been re-named Zaire in 1971. The UN was slow to respond, causing Lumumba to turn to
the Soviet Union. This turned Zaire into a Cold War battleground with the Western states placing
Mobutu Sese Seko in power. Mobutu ruled the country with deep pockets, surrounding himself
with his followers and preventing any political opposition from forming against him. 124
By 1980 the people were starving and there was little that could be done. Eighty percent
of the country’s resources went toward the presidency, causing Mobutu to be one of the richest
men of the world and president of one of the poorest countries in the world. 125 By 1990, the Cold
War was drawing to a close and Western states could no longer ignore the way Mobutu was
ruling the country. Mobutu was forced to make concessions such as allowing political parties to
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form and reducing the repression of his citizenry. However, the changes were not enough and
soon Western countries began refusing aid to Zaire.
In 1992, troops were threatening mutiny and Mobutu was forced to buy currency from
Germany in order to pay them. These practices led to hyperinflation and the Zairian dollar at the
time was valued at $110 million to $1 US dollar.126 The loyalty of the army declined drastically
as unpaid troops refused to remain under Mobutu. The situation in Zaire worsened further as
hundreds of thousands of refugees from the 1994 Rwanda genocide flooded into the country. 127
These issues were compounded by the fact that Mobutu was diagnosed with prostate cancer and
was forced to neglect the state even further to seek treatment. The weak state and dismal
situation finally allowed a rebel movement to form after 30 years of Mobutu’s kleptocracy.
In 1996, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) was
formed and led by Joseph Kabila. The group declared war on the nearly defunct Mobutu regime
as Mobutu sought cancer treatment in Europe. Kabila’s main goal was to seize power for himself
and rather than pursue an altruistic goal of saving Zaire. 128 The ADFL received financial and
military help from neighboring Rwanda, Uganda and Angola and gained significant ground in
Zaire by the time Mobutu returned in December of 1996.
While Mobutu was able to rally his forces and delay an offensive it was clear by May
1997 that the country was lost to the ADFL. Mobutu fled to Morocco and Kabila renamed the
country the Democratic Republic of Congo and declared himself president. Kabila remained a
strong ally to Rwanda and Uganda. Rwanda intervened because the new government following
the genocide was unhappy with Mobutu’s support of the Hutu troops who were responsible for
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the killing. The troops were not only allowed to remain in eastern Zaire but they were being
supplied with weapons by Mobutu and his government. Soon these forces began launching
attacks against Rwanda from their camps within Zaire. 129 This caused the new Rwandan
government to do whatever it took to remove Mobutu from power.130
Kabila proved to be little better than Mobutu, not only in his leadership of the Democratic
Republic of Congo but in his treatment of Rwanda. The troops who had helped Kabila win the
country refused to leave once Kabila was in power. Having Rwandan troops in the capital caused
many Congolese to believe that Kabila was nothing more than a pawn of foreign powers, so
Kabila knew they had to leave.131 In July of 1998, he accused his Rwandan ally of plotting
against him and forced all Rwandan troops out of the country.
This led to a new rebel group: the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD)
which formed with the support of Rwanda and Uganda. By August of 1998, the rebel forces
were seizing several areas in eastern DRC and moved quickly through the country, making use
of captured aircraft. Kabilia knew that his chances for survival rested on foreign assistance, but
this time he could not call on Rwanda or Uganda for help. Instead he turned to the SADC and
gained the help of Zimbabwe and Angola. 132

Reasons for SADC Intervention
When the conflict in the DRC broke out, the SADC was structurally divided. The SADC
was chaired by President Mandela from South Africa and the Organ on Politics, Defense and
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Security Co-Operation was headed by President Mugabe from Zimbabwe. The Organ was
allowed to act autonomously from the SADC and did not have to get permission from the SADC
chair or even a majority of states in order to make decisions. This caused a great deal of tension
between Mandela and Mugabe who both struggled to have more control in the SADC. The chair
of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-Operation was meant to rotate annually, a
process which stopped when Mugabe took the chair. Once he was in control, Mugabe would
often make decisions on behalf of the SADC without consulting the other states, or even all of
the members of the Organ.133 This was due to the power granted to the Organ to function
independently at the Summit level, which was the highest level of authority within the SADC.
On August 7, 1998, a month after the rebellion began Mugabe held a meeting in Victoria
Falls with the heads of state for Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and
Zambia. Mandela, despite being President of South Africa and chair of the SADC was not
invited due to the friction between Mandela and Mugabe over the power of the Organ. 134 On
August 18th, Mugabe declared that the SADC had unanimously decided to answer Kabilia’s
appeal for help, despite that fact that only seven of the SADC’s states attended the meeting.
Mandela’s spokesperson stated that the meeting held by Mugabe could not have been done under
the auspices of the SADC. 135
South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, and Tanzania all sought a peaceful and diplomatic
solution to the crisis in the DRC. On the 23rd of August, Mandela convened an emergency
summit meeting to discuss the authority of the SADC over the actions of the Organ. Mugabe did
not attend the meeting, suggesting instead that the OAU must now be enlisted to solve the
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problem because the SADC was too divided. 136 Angola and the DRC also refused to attend the
summit meeting and Mozambique stated that they would not send troops to the DRC without the
support of the SADC and the OAU.137
The states that decided to intervene in the DRC did so under OAU and UN protocols
allowing collective self-defense in response to an armed attack against a member of the
organization. There was also the SADC protocol on the use of collective action in the event of an
attempted coup against a member state. However, this protocol was never voted on by the
SADC and was only presented by South Africa to the SADC. 138 The establishment of stability
and security for the region was the main goal of those who decided that military intervention was
necessary, but it was also the goal of those who wished for a peaceful solution.
Similar to the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, there were issues of national interest for
the states that chose to intervene, as well as for the states that chose to seek a peaceful resolution.
Mugabe’s reasons for spearheading the SADC intervention were both political and economic.
When the conflict broke out with Rwandan and Ugandan forces supporting the rebels and
Western support for the allies, it was seen as disrespectful to Mugabe. Mugabe felt that he was
the leading player in southern Africa and therefore the imperialist tendencies and territorial
aggression were not permitted without his approval or inclusion. 139
Kabila also made it clear that there would be rewards for the countries that came to his
aid. When Mugabe decided to intervene in the DRC, his country’s economy was already
crumbling. Zimbabwe spent US$3 million a month on intervention in the DRC and while this
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accelerated the economic decline it did not come without benefits, especially for Zimbabwe’s
elite. Hundreds of acres of farmland were handed over to Zimbabwe; contracts with mining
companies and even mining concessions were given directly to the troops to pay for their
support.140 As the conflict continued, Kabila paid for Zimbabwe’s continued assistance with
more mining concessions and contracts, as well as allowing the Zimbabwean troops to take from
the land that they occupied.141
Angola also had its own reasons for intervening in the conflict. Like Mugabe and
Zimbabwe, there was a personal reason for Angola’s intervention. On the eve of Angola’s fight
for independence in 1975, Katangan soldiers changed the tide of the revolution and ensured that
Angola would gain its independence. This was a debt of which Kabila’s minister, a Katangan,
was quick to remind Angola. 142 Angola was also unhappy with the fact that its two allies,
Uganda and Rwanda, had invaded a country nearby without consulting them. 143 This was enough
reason for Angola to support the intervention and send troops.
Namibia was the third major player within the SADC to support military intervention in
the DRC. The biggest reason that Namibia chose to intervene was because they wanted to build
ties with its ally Angola.144 They also owed a debt to Angola for allowing the South West Africa
People’s Organization (SWAPO) to build camps in southern Angola in 1966. 145
All three countries signed the Luanda Mutual Defense Pact with the DRC in 1998, which
required them to come to the aid of any signatory that was attacked. This only added to the

140

(Tavares, 2011, p. 162)
(Tavares, 2011, pp. 162-163)
142
(Turner, 2002, p. 85)
143
(Turner, 2002, p. 85)
144
(Tavares, 2011, p. 164)
145
(Tavares, 2011, p. 164)
141

69

reasons why they pushed for a military intervention by the SADC. However they were unable to
find unanimous or even tacit support from the other members.
South Africa and other members of the SADC called for an immediate ceasefire and a
move toward peace talks on the political future of the DRC. The Summit meeting of August 23,
1998, ended with member states agreeing that Mandela should work with the OAU to find a
peaceful solution to the conflict, including the withdrawal of all foreign troops and movement
toward national reconciliation. There was also a push to try and merge the initiatives of the
Summit meeting with the decisions of the Organ. 146 On August 31, 1998, the UN issued a similar
statement about a peaceful solution to the DRC conflict. 147
The reason why South African leaders became so involved with the conflict was their
belief that regional stability was necessary for South Africa to build stronger trade relations and a
stronger economy. As a post-apartheid country there was not only a great disparity of wealth but
a struggling economy and high rates of poverty, all of which South Africa hoped to remedy
through a strong economic community. 148 There was also a concern of spillover of the conflict
into South African territory, a concern that was very real since one of the reasons why the Congo
conflict persisted was spillover from the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
A month later Mandela and the SADC changed their stance and announced that the
organization unanimously supported the military intervention by Zimbabwe, Angola and
Namibia. While Mandela still wanted to work toward a ceasefire and peaceful talks, he hoped
that by supporting the military intervention that unity could return to the SADC. 149 However, the
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SADC remained split as the organization tried to endorse both the military intervention by
Zimbabwe and the peaceful resolution of South Africa.
While the SADC continued with their two pronged approach the conflict spiraled further
out of control. Sudan and Chad joined the forces supporting Kabilia, while Burundi joined forces
with Rwanda and Uganda. By the end of 1998, the conflict in the DRC had become Africa’s
largest war with nine different countries directly involved in the fighting and the SADC
struggling to bring stability and peace to the region.

The SADC in the DRC
The divisions within the SADC meant that only a limited number of SADC states
provided troops or financial support for the military intervention. The majority of SADC
resources went toward negotiating peace settlements and finding a way to stop the spread of the
war. The military intervention occurred first and was the first step in forcing the SADC’s hand in
becoming involved with the crisis.
Once Mugabe decided to intervene, Zimbabwean troops and their allies entered the DRC,
knowing that they could not trust any of the soldiers within the DRC, including those who
claimed to still be part of the national army. This meant that protecting Kabila would have to be
done by the Zimbabwean troops. It was also apparent that there were several other international
players trying to get control of parts of the DRC in the middle of the conflict. Mugabe wanted to
make sure that these actions were seen as illegitimate while the actions taken by Zimbabwe and
its allies would be seen as the lawful protectors of stability. He hoped that by gaining the
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SADC’s backing it would show which force was the right one for the Western nations and the
people of the Congo to support.150
The first goal was to create a fast advance that would push the Rwandan forces out of the
capital so as to restore a semblance of government and order to the country. The rebel forces had
taken control of key parts of Kinshasa and were attempting to starve the city and force Kabila to
step down, so regaining control of Kinshasa was imperative. To do this Zimbabwe, Angola and
Namibia entered the country with tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters and aircraft to create a
force that would easily take back the country.
The initial skirmishes between SADC forces and the rebels quickly revealed that the
“rebels” were really highly trained and organized Rwandan and Ugandan troops. As Mugabe
hoped, the people of the Congo quickly rallied to the side of the SADC forces, partially because
they were angry at the atrocities committed by the Rwandan Tutsi occupiers. The initial phase of
the intervention was successful. Kabila was placed under protection and Kinshasa and important
neighboring cities were secured. Zimbabwean electricians were able to return power to the city,
which had been powerless for over a month due to rebel forces taking over the hydroelectric
dam. The airport was also reopened for both commercial and normal operations. 151
These efforts brought an initial sense of stability to the DRC and its government. It also
prompted the conflict to grow even larger as Rwanda and Uganda refused to back down. Six
national armies and everything under their control from tanks and helicopters to rockets and
fighter planes came to a head on Congolese soil. With SADC forces and Rwanda, Uganda and
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now Burundi throwing everything they had into the conflict, it was not long before a stalemate
was reached.152
The stalemate was the opportunity that the proponents of a peaceful solution had been
waiting for. While there had been more than twenty attempts to broker a peace agreement by the
SADC, they all failed, because neither side would agree to peace.153 The Lusaka Peace
Agreement was negotiated on July 10, 1999 and it called for an end to the conflict, with foreign
troops leaving the Congo and rebel forces disarming. It also called for a new government and
democratic elections to be held. A month after the agreement was signed; fighting broke out once
again, this time between Rwandan and Ugandan forces. As efforts toward a ceasefire continued,
both countries began sponsoring rebel groups led by warlords who took over areas of lawless
east DRC. For its own right, Rwanda had little reason to leave the Congo, with reports estimating
that at the height of the war $250 million in Congolese mineral profits went to the Rwandan
army and allied businesses.154 Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda since 2000, even called the
intervention in the Congo “self-sustaining” leaving plenty to gain at little cost for Rwanda. 155
The situation was similar for the other states involved in the conflict. While Zimbabwe
was suffering from a disintegrating economy it still saw a benefit to spending $3 million a month
on the Congo intervention. When the Lusaka agreement was signed, profits for the SADC
countries were slowing down and even Zimbabwe admitted that it was time for a political
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solution. 156 However, the fighting was ongoing, even as efforts to keep the capital safe and build
a new government continued.
In 2001, Kabila was assassinated and succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila, who called for
multilateral peace talks headed by the UN to ensure that the terms of the Lusaka ceasefire
agreement were met.157 By June 2003, all foreign forces, with the exception of Rwanda had
pulled out of the country. As the DRC was moving toward democracy and few SADC states
were willing to continue the expensive intervention, the SADC pulled out of the country. In
2006, the first multiparty elections were held and Joseph Kabila was elected president.
Despite the progress, fighting still affects the Congo as rebel forces headed by warlords
looking for plunder ravage large portions of the country. The United Nations and the Human
Rights Watch claim that the rebel forces are still being supported by neighboring countries,
especially Rwanda. 158 As late as 2008, people of Congo were dying at a rate of 45,000 persons a
month, showing that the conflict was nowhere near over. 159 In 2009, Joseph Kabila invited
Rwandan troops to help hunt down the Hutu rebel groups in the DRC. Even though they were
successfully able to capture the main leadership, yet the fighting has not stopped.160
The war has displaced millions and has had a death toll of over 5 million, either from
starvation and illness, or direct killings. 161 Sexual violence persists, especially in the eastern
areas of the Congo where rebel forces retain a strong hold. The efforts of the democratic
government to bring peace and stop the rebel violence remains a struggle, as new rebel groups
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return to replace the old ones. In 2012, a new rebel group formed from members of the
Congolese army, which demanded higher pay and better weapons. The DRC accused the rebel
group of being a front for Rwanda to advance its exploitive enterprises in the country.162 With
renewed conflict in the DRC the SADC has once again pledged troops to help return stability to
the country and secure stability for the region.

Democracy Before and After Intervention
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The DRC currently has a Polity IV rating of 5 163, which suggests that the government is
moving toward a more democratic and stable regime. The Polity IV score says nothing of the
ongoing violence in many regions of the DRC. Before SADC intervention, the DRC had a Polity
IV rating of -77 all the way back to 1992. Prior to that date, it held a score of -8.164 Politically the
country has progressed but the country’s political and economic stability continues to decline.
Under Mobutu, the country functioned as little more than a business enterprise for
Mobutu and his allies. In 1990 under political pressure from the international community
Mobutu announced that Zaire would move toward democracy. Human Rights Watch reported in
1992 that there was significant progress in the liberalization of the country as long term political
detention ceased. There were still reported cases of opposition figures and journalists
disappearing or of suspicious deaths. Censorship of newspapers and media was decreasing but
there were still actions taken against newspapers or journalists who spoke out against the
government.165
Mobutu continued to centralize his power and to silence his opposition. In February of
1993, he dismissed the Prime Minister whom he had appointed as head of the transitional
government and announced that he would not relinquish his firm control over the treasury or the
armed forces.166 Mobutu would not be pressured by Western allies that threatened sanctions if
Mobutu did not step down.
Under the new government that was created in 2006 following years of peace initiatives
by the SADC and UN, there has been improvement in civil rights issues. However, 2006 was
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marred by several problems, including a boycott by the opposition. 167 The public accepted the
election largely because of the international influence by making sure that the elections bought
the peace and stability that they promised.
The elections did not completely turn the tide as the 2012 report from Transparency
International put the DRC as 160th out of 176 countries, with a score of 21.168 The Mo Ibrahim
Foundation rates the DRC government as 51st out of 52 African countries. 169
The 2011 elections elicited numerous calls of illegitimacy by the opposition as Joseph
Kabala was re-elected. The Carter Center observed the 2011 elections and found numerous
irregularities such as voter inflation in areas loyal to Kabila and voter suppression in areas
supportive of the opposition. In some areas loyal to Kabila, voter turnout was 99 to 100 percent,
a turn out that the Carter Center disputes, saying that 100% turnout is impossible when few
streets are paved and every vote is for Kabila. 170
The SADC left the DRC with little stability and only a semblance of democracy. While
the Polity IV score has improved, the conditions in the DRC for the general population have not.
There are more political freedoms and civil rights, nevertheless the government continues to
maintain a firm hold on state power and limiting the ability of the people to have their voices
heard.
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Other SADC Interventions
Like ECOWAS there were few instances where the majority of SADC states approved of
substantial military intervention. Lesotho and Madagascar are the only other cases of direct
military intervention by SADC states into another state. However, it is important to note that one
of the most telling cases on SADC intervention is Zimbabwe, a state that despite human rights
abuses, electoral concerns and extreme repression never experienced the strong arm of the
SADC. The Madagascar intervention has not yet reached its conclusion, however the effects of
action in Lesotho and the lack of action in Zimbabwe are well known.

Lesotho
The Lesotho intervention was unique and unexpected because it occurred only a month
after the intervention into the DRC, and it was spear headed by South Africa. The reasons why
South Africa chose to intervene militarily in Lesotho after adamantly criticizing the use of
military force in the DRC are unclear. In fact, much like the DRC intervention, the Lesotho
intervention occurred without the direct consent of the members of the SADC.
In 1994, King Letsie III suspended the constitution and dissolved the administration of
Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle. This action effectively became a royal coup as the constitutional
government of Lesotho no longer existed. Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe condemned
the coup and South Africa responded by deploying troops to the Lesotho border. The show of
force by South Africa was enough for King Letsie to reinstate the government and abdicate this
throne, allowing his father to take the throne.
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Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe decided to become the guarantors of Lesotho
stability from that point onward. So when discontent erupted over national elections in 1998, the
newly elected Prime Minister Paklitha Mosisili wrote to the SADC about the impending coup.
South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were quick to respond but South Africa
supplied the majority of troops and the logistical coordination for the intervention to prevent the
coup.
South Africa claimed that the intervention was under SADC auspices, claiming SADC
protocol about not allowing coups d’état. However, the protocol to not allow coups d’état was
only proposed by South Africa and never approved by the SADC, nor was any aspect of South
Africa’s intervention into Lesotho approved by the SADC. 171 There was little discussion about
the situation in Lesotho within the SADC prior to the intervention and the most that was done
was to set up a committee to find out whether or not the 1998 elections were fraudulent.
The intervention into Lesotho was met with unexpected resistance by the Lesotho army
which killed several South African soldiers and their allies. The fighting caused Lesotho to erupt
into a state of anarchy with public demonstrations against the intervention. The demonstrations
led to a virtual sacking of the capital and thousands of people were displaced. The initial
operation into Lesotho was filled with strategic and tactical errors and was seen as a military and
political disaster.172 The situation became a huge embarrassment for South Africa.
The failure of the mission was largely due to the fact that South Africa still had a fledging
government. At only four years old, the African National Congress (ANC) had not yet created a
political and strategic coherence between state departments. The decision-making procedures
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within the military were also ad hoc and rudimentary as the new government had very little
experience with effective military operations.
Despite the criticisms over the failure of the initial operation and the justification for the
intervention, South Africa continued to play a peacekeeping role in Lesotho. South Africa was
able to facilitate negotiations between the parties and eventually and agreement was reached
regarding the disputed elections. The intervention troops remained until May 1999, when a new
electoral system was in place. Successful elections were held in 2002.
The reasons behind the South African military intervention into Lesotho are not entirely
clear, given the rejection of Zimbabwe’s intervention into the DRC just a month earlier. Bringing
stability to Lesotho was part of South Africa’s goal of bringing stability to the region in order to
boost their own economic growth, but military intervention was not part of the peaceful
initiatives of South Africa. However, there was a significant caveat to the Lesotho conflict in that
Lesotho Highlands Water Project was the largest series of dams in Africa. It provided a steam of
income to Lesotho while sending water to South Africa’s central province, which included
Johannesburg and Pretoria. Protecting the water supply was a major objective for South
Africa.173
While there were several reasons for South Africa to become involved in Lesotho, the
reasons to intervene in Zimbabwe were far less compelling. Therefore, neither the South Africa
nor other states within the SADC were willing to intervene in the Zimbabwe crisis.
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Zimbabwe
The issues with Zimbabwe came to a head in 2000, but they were boiling under the
surface for decades. In February of 2000, the ruling party Zimbabwe National Union Patriotic
Front (Zanu-PF) lost a constitutional referendum, the first defeat since 1980. The defeat came
largely due to the rise of an opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The
constitutional referendum would have allowed President Robert Mugabe to remain in power and
would give immunity to Mugabe’s government and security forces for any illegal acts committed
while in office. It also allowed for the government to seize any land without paying for the land
itself, only improvements on the land.
Following the vote, Zimbabwean war veterans who were struggling under severe poverty
but were ignored by the government began invading and occupying white owned farmed. The
Zimbabwean government supported the occupation and began its own program of land seizures,
despite the vote against it. The international community responded with tough sanctions that
threatened the economy and the stability of Zimbabwe.
The SADC responded by supporting the “land reform” program of Zimbabwe, stating
that it was simply a way of redistributing land. At the time, 1% of the population owned 70% of
the best arable land in Zimbabwe. A South African foreign affairs official also supported the
occupation of farms by veterans as an understandable response to Britain’s failure to fund the
land redistribution program.
Even as refugees streamed across the borders of SADC states and the economic situation
became even more dire, the SADC leaders refused to see a problem in Zimbabwe. In December
2001, the members of the task force assigned to assist Zimbabwe with the economic and political
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issues affecting the country, found that the situation was improving. They even rejected the grim
view of Zimbabwe that was presented by the international media, even as reports of violence
against MDC members were well known. In 2002 a SADC summit communique went as far as
to welcome the following actions from the Zanu-PF regime: the respect for human rights, the
commitment to investigating any claims of political violence and the commitment to fair
elections and the rule of law.
However, Mugabe ignored the diplomatic requests by the SADC and the SADC
continued to act complacent in light of continuing repression. In 2005, the Zanu-PF won
parliamentary elections by a landslide. Observers from AU, SADC and South Africa endorsed
the elections as being the will of the people, even as the International Crisis Group reported the
government’s systematic use of propaganda, violence, electoral manipulation, targeted
disenfranchisement and abuse of humanitarian relief. 174
The situation continued to deteriorate and by 2007, inflation in Zimbabwe was anywhere
from 7,600 percent to 13,000 percent. Government repression of opposition was rampant as
MDC members were imprisoned, tortured and killed. Political rallies were outlawed and nearly a
quarter of the population had fled the country. 175 President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa was put
in charge of mediations between the Zanu-PF and the MDC, but it became apparent to the MDC
and even the international community that Mbeki was biased toward the Zanu-PF government
and Mugabe.
Despite the problems mediation was able to bring election reform and new elections in
2008. When it came down to a runoff election between Mugabe and MDC leader Tsvangirai,
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Tsavangirai pulled out of the election. The political repression and violent threats made it
impossible for Tsvangirai to continue his campaign, allowing Mugabe to win by a landslide. The
international community found the election fraudulent and only the SADC continued to support
the Mugabe regime. Mbeki continued his mediations, however, and this led to a coalition
government in February 2009. The coalition placed Mugabe as President and Tsvangirai as
Prime Minister.
There was no pressure for Mugabe to truly bring Tsvangirai and the MDC into a true
partnership, so the Zanu-PF continued to maintain most of the power within Zimbabwe.
Tsvangirai and the MDC had few options with a mediator that was bias toward Mugabe and a
party that was severely weakened by years of repression. The mediation did little to inspire
cooperation between the two parties and it continues to simply be a way for Mugabe to gain
legitimacy within the international community.
Due to the divisions within the SADC about how to handle the situation in Zimbabwe,
more was not done. There was little initiative to hold Zimbabwe to the respect for human rights,
the rule of law and for the democratic process by the SADC. The reasons why SADC states
chose to support Mugabe and his presidency over the goals and ambitions in the SADC treaty
were largely due to the norms of state solidarity and anti-imperialism. 176 There was little effort to
intervene on behalf of human rights and democracy.
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Conclusion
The SADC differed from ECOWAS in that it planned to have some sort of institution to
address security concerns. However, like ECOWAS there were few mechanisms in place for
how any interventions would be handled. The SADC did not have any interventions that
included at least agreement for military intervention from a majority of member states.
Both the SADC military interventions into Lesotho and the DRC did not even consult the
entire membership of the SADC before beginning the intervention. In both cases it was merely a
handful of states operating on behalf of national interests and claiming SADC mandate after the
fact. National interests were the driving force behind the SADC interventions, and the dominant
concern for the major players in the interventions was stability.
The lack of intervention into Zimbabwe showed a desire to maintain status quo. Many
SADC states were not willing to act against the established Zimbabwe government, especially
when Mugabe had been such a dominant player in SADC politics. Even when it became clear
that Zimbabwe was facing economic collapse and severe human rights abuses, the threat to
stability of the region was not enough to convince SADC states to go against the status quo. The
blind spot of President Thabo Mbeki and the rest of the SADC toward the repression and abuses
committee by Mugabe were nothing short of shocking to the international community. 177
The SADC also had few mechanisms in place to secure compliance to the Treaty by
member states. While there was the ability to impose sanctions or suspend states, there were no
circumstances in place for when such things should happen. There was also no unbiased reports
given to the SADC about the state of affairs in Zimbabwe and it was apparent that the
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organization refused to believe the reports in the international media. 178 The lack of
accountability mechanisms within the SADC prevented interventions from being a joint
operation rather than just matters of national interest.
When the SADC was founded there was a strong emphasis on the necessity of policy
agreement, and this proved to be the defining point for both the SADC and ECOWAS. It was
only when national interest coincided that interventions became operations that involved all
members of the regional organization. With the SADC, the DRC war was a major threat to the
stability of the region but there was no discussion among the entire membership about how to
proceed. The lack of unity and trust among the members prevented the operation from having a
joint approach. The split approach of the SADC to the DRC crisis would not have been a
problem if it had been that approach from the start, but the decision of Zimbabwe to intervene
without consulting all SADC states created distrust throughout the membership. A joint
operation between Zimbabwe and South Africa would have had a much better chance at bringing
stability to the DRC. The following operation into Lesotho which did include both South Africa
and Zimbabwe had better success, if it still was riddled with problems and was also without
SADC approval.
The operation of ECOWAS into Liberia may not have been favored by all member states
but a majority were at least willing to authorize the intervention. As the intervention continued
and as national interests changed, more and more states were willing to supply troops and
support. It was common national interests that led to the ECOWAS intervention being more
successful than intervention attempts by the SADC.
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Table 1 Intervention Components and Outcomes

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS

The interventions performed by ECOWAS and the SADC are both important because
they are some of the first initiatives by African organizations to try and bring stability and
democracy to the region. The ECOWAS intervention into Liberia was the first time that any
economic community had intervened militarily in a conflict, thus stressing the importance of the
conflict to the stability of the region. Both interventions had their good and bad points and both
were started by organizations without a majority membership of democracies.
What the case studies show is that success is largely based upon common interests. While
both organizations had member states that wanted peaceful solutions and supported military
intervention, there was more cohesion on the part of ECOWAS. The split between military and
diplomatic initiatives of the SADC prevented the intervention from having the forces and the
power it needed to create a major impact on the DRC.
Both organizations acted out of a fear of instability and national interests. For ECOWAS
it was apparent that the region was experiencing instability within several states and the
problems in Liberia were enough to tip the scales. The instability, regime changes and
revolutions that occurred in the years following the Liberian intervention show how volatile the
situation was. The interventions in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau by ECOWAS occurred soon
after the Liberian intervention and they both had very different results.
Both the Liberian and DRC interventions were spearheaded by a state that hoped to be
seen as a regional hegemon. Nigeria and Zimbabwe both wanted to be seen as the dominant
power within their region. Both states also had reasons to want to draw international attention
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away from the problems within their own boarders and instead show what they could do for the
region as a whole.
What is shown by these case studies is that a regional organization does not have to have
a majority membership of democracies in order to promote or establish a democratic regime
within their region. The interventions into Liberia and the DRC were able to establish a state that
was moving toward an established democracy, however only one intervention brought true
stability. In fact, one of the reasons why the Liberian intervention was so successful was because
the autocratic regimes or states in transition, knew that their hold on power was tenuous.
Reducing the conflict in the region was essential to securing what little stability they had over
their own state, including using the intervention as way to get rid of any potential rebel threats in
the military.

Can African Regional Organizations Promote Stability and Democracy?
The focus of this thesis was to determine whether African regional organizations can
promote stability and democracy. However, as the case studies showed, initially there was no
focus on democracy by any of the major states involved in the interventions or within the
organizations themselves. The only time that democracy was discussed was following the
intervention and the organization needed a way to maintain the stability that the intervention had
created.
While the focus was not on democracy, these interventions did lead to transforming
autocratic states into democracies. This does only seem to occur when a state is in the middle of
a crisis; otherwise the organization does not care if member states are democracies or
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autocracies. This is shown in the lack of interventions into states with established autocracies,
but do not threaten the stability of the region, such as Swaziland.

Stability over Democracy
While democratic tenets are part of the treaties of both organizations, they are not
enforced to the extent that the treaty suggests. The SADC has yet to place any restrictions on
Swaziland despite its strongly autocratic regime and Gambia with a Polity IV score of -5 has full
rights as a member of ECOWAS. What mattered to the autocratic and democratic states of
ECOWAS and the SADC was not regime type, but stability.
At the end of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, the organization was tired of the
fighting and the maintenance of troops. The main goal was to bring stability to the state and to
the region so that ECOMOG could pull out and leave Liberia. ECOWAS member states believed
that a democratic government with free and fair elections was the best way to ensure the stability
and the lack of a new rebel uprising. Another indication of the desire of ECOWAS to ensure
stability over democracy was their support of Charles Taylor as the presidential candidate for
Liberia. It was believed that if Charles Taylor did not win, he would simply rebel again. This
belief was shared by Liberians as the main reason why they decided to vote for Taylor - they
hoped it would end the violence. 179
On the part of the SADC, the goal was also stability. The states that favored a peaceful
solution and those that favored military intervention both wanted stability for the DRC and the
region. Both South Africa and Zimbabwe, the major players in the SADC wanted to promote
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stability within their region. Zimbabwe wanted to promote stability as the perceived regional
hegemon and South Africa wanted stability for better trade relations to boost their economy.
The belief that democracies are more stable is not new. The democratic peace theory
suggests that democracies do not fight with other democracies. 180 More importantly for these
case studies, research has shown that democracies are less prone to civil war. 181 Therefore, states
and organizations looking to promote stability within their region would have better chances for
long term peace by creating a democratic government over an autocratic one.
In terms of member states within an organization, if stability is the goal then it would be
understandable why the SADC would not take action against Swaziland, even though the state
does not have a democratic regime. Research has shown that strongly autocratic regimes, like
Swaziland, are less likely to experience civil war than intermediate regimes. 182 Since Swaziland
has little chance of degenerating into a civil war that could threaten the region, it is more
important for SADC states to focus on other matters rather than trying to promote democracy
within Swaziland. The same research concludes that states in transition from autocracy to
democracy are also more likely to engage in civil war than states that either have strong
democracies or strong autocracies, so forcing liberalization onto Swaziland might even cause
instability.
Strong democracies are still less likely to experience civil war than strong autocracies, so
in states where civil war or rebellion is already occurring, it is more beneficial to establish a
democratic government over an autocratic one.
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Autocracies and Promoting Democracy
Contrary to the research of Pevehouse, in African regional organizations autocracies have
the potential to spur democratic change, even more so than democratic regimes. The
interventions into conflicts by the SADC and ECOWAS were both spearheaded by autocracies,
with the exception of the intervention by the SADC into Lesotho. It was actually because
Nigeria was an autocracy that it was so important for Liberia and even Sierra Leone to move
toward democracy.
As a firmly established autocracy, the government of Nigeria was well known for
repression of civil rights and for human rights abuses. The international community harshly
criticized Nigeria and threatened to impose harsh sanctions. Nigeria was barred from meetings of
the Commonwealth because of the known human rights abuses that were occurring in the
country. By promoting peacekeeping missions throughout Africa, Nigeria was able to get some
positive attention and turn the focus of the international community away from what was
happening inside the country. The goal of promoting democracy within Liberia and Sierra Leone
was part of an initiative to increase the international opinion of the current state Nigeria and its
government. Nigeria even used its support of interventions as a way to garner support from other
states within ECOWAS, as backup against criticisms from the international community. This
directly contradicts the work of Bueno de Mesquita and Downs whose research suggested that
Nigeria would never support a transition to democracy in Liberia or any other state. 183
In turn, when Nigeria moved toward a civilian and democratic government, it was no
longer willing to maintain costly interventions in other states. It pulled out of Sierra Leone and
refused to supply troops or substantial finances toward the Guinea-Bissau intervention. Those
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resources were needed to solve problems at home. When it was an autocracy, it was easier for
Nigeria to spare those resources and devote them to causes outside of the state. As a democracy,
Nigeria no longer had that luxury. This suggests that there are cases where an autocracy would
be more likely to support democratic transitions in another state than that of a democracy.
It is also important to note that for the DRC intervention there were more democracies
within the SADC than any other regime type; therefore the SADC should have been more
successful in promoting a transition to democracy. In reality, it was the autocracy dominated
ECOWAS that was more successful in promoting democracy. It was a period of instability and
transitions to democracy from the ground up that prompted democratic changes within the
SADC and ECOWAS. This supports the work of Olonisakin, that African regional organizations
will be transformed by transitions to democracy within the state and not the other way around.

Democracy and Economy
Both the SADC and ECOWAS were established as primarily economic regional
organizations. Their goal was to establish trade arrangements and spur foreign investment in the
region in order to spur development within member states. Both organizations did include
aspects of good governance and democracy within their treaties, under the belief that stability
and democracy where necessary for economic growth in the region.
The Liberian crisis created a situation that threatened the stability and the ability of the
entire region to successfully build their economies and have effective trade relations. This caused
the crisis to become part of the economic and stability goals of ECOWAS to intervene militarily,
even though there were no institutions within ECOWAS for military intervention. While
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democracy was not the focus of the intervention at its onset, democracy was always part of the
goals of the organization within all member states. This seems contradictory for organizations
that were composed of mostly autocratic regimes.
Yet democratic regimes had more to offer for the economic future of both regions than
autocratic regimes. Not only would more democratic states lead to greater foreign investment as
Western investors were more likely to invest in democratic regimes than autocratic ones. There
has also been research that suggests that states with democracies have economic growth that is
not as affected by corruption as states with autocratic regimes. 184 The level of corruption within
autocratic regimes makes it difficult for development efforts to be successful. Evidence of this
can be seen in how corrupt Nigerian officials and military leaders took money for themselves
while billing it under ECOWAS expenses for the interventions.

What Are the Necessary Structures and Institutions to Promote Democracy and Stability?
From the two case studies is apparent that one of the necessary structures for an
intervention to be successful is a strong mandate and mechanisms in place to run a peacekeeping
operation. Neither ECOWAS nor the SADC had the necessary structures in place for a
peacekeeping force to be accountable to the political objectives of the organization. Nor were
there structures to help the peacekeeping force to work hand in hand with the efforts to forge a
peace agreement. A direct line of communication between the peacekeeping forces and the
regional organization is necessary to make sure that the force not only maintains its neutrality
and ability to be a peacekeeping force, but also to perform ambassadorial duties.
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The findings in this paper coincide with the work of Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom
and the work of Hansen, Mitchell and Nemeth who found that member cohesiveness and strong
institutions contribute to the ability of international organizations to influence policy and regimes
within member nations.185

Policy Agreement/National Interests
At the time of its formation one of the core aspects of the SADC was to have policy
agreement among members. The belief was that only through policy agreement would the
organization be able to thrive.186 This is necessary for any regional organization, that the
members have similar goals and expectations for the organization. While there was some
dissention in ECOWAS for each intervention, the majority of states either agreed to the need for
intervention or directly contributed to the military intervention. For the SADC, there was never a
majority consensus on how to approach the situations in Lesotho or the DRC. This prevented the
SADC peacekeeping initiatives from getting the full support of the international community and
even the full force of the SADC toward the peacekeeping missions.
At the heart of every peacekeeping operation by ECOWAS and the SADC were national
interests by member states. This is yet another reason why policy agreement are so pivotal to the
success of African regional organizations in particular. With so few states having substantial
resources to spare, states need to work together to promote stability. Therefore, the national
interests of the member states need to coincide so that peacekeeping missions will be successful.
In the case of the ECOWAS interventions, the entire region was unstable and many of the states
185
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themselves were only in tentative control, so it was in the national interest of most of the states to
prevent anything from tipping the scales in the wrong direction. While there were some
differences in national interests for why each state ultimately decided to support or be a part of
the intervention, at the core was always stability for themselves and the region.
Using Mills methods it is clear that in situations where there was no policy agreement on
the matter of intervention, the intervention was unable to progress to complete stability and
democracy. In the cases where there was strong policy agreement such as in the ECOWAS
interventions, the organization was more likely to succeed in its intervention efforts. However,
the failure of the intervention in Guinea-Bissau and the necessity for UN help in the Sierra Leone
intervention, prove that it does take more than just policy agreement for an intervention to be
successful.
The national interests of SADC states in the DRC conflict were also focused on stability.
More states were involved with the DRC conflict than any other and it was clear that it could
ruin the potential for stability and trade within the region if the situation was not put under
control. However, there were also national interests in conflict within SADC. South Africa was
looking to protect its future trading region, Zimbabwe wanted to be established as a regional
powerhouse, and both were getting something out of their separate efforts in the conflict.
Zimbabwe elites were being paid for their assistance in the intervention and South Africa was
getting positive attention from the international community by seeking a peaceful solution. It was
not until the stalemate that the national interests of all the parties converged to the point where
the SADC could present a united initiative toward peace. By then the region was too unstable
and the rewards still too great for the region to be safe from rebel forces.
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Highly Defined Institutions and a Strong Mandate
The biggest problem for ECOMOG in Liberia and it the interventions that followed, was
a lack of direct communication and structure connecting it to ECOWAS. There was no
established institution for overseeing or maintaining a peacekeeping force and therefore there
was little understanding of who the leaders of ECOMOG would report to. The leaders were
largely on their own for both military and political decisions. This added to the concerns over
neutrality because the ECOMOG leaders were almost always Nigerian and therefore followed
the political and military goals of Nigeria.
A clearly defined mandate that offers clear rules and guidelines for member states would
prevent issues such as Zimbabwe within the regional organization. There would be a clearly
defined consequence for human rights abuses and repression, regardless of the state or leader
responsible for those crimes. An option for states to air grievances or discuss problems is also
beneficial to deal with issues where states are not fulfilling their obligations to the organization.
This is drawn from the work of Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom that suggest that a strong
organizational mandate on security concerns is pivotal to the success of a regional organization.
In Africa, where security issues and instability are rampant in many states, the need for a security
structure within African regional organizations is necessary for lasting success and stability in
the region.
Clear definitions of the institutions are also necessary for the success of a regional
organization to reach their goals. The poorly defined responsibilities of the Organ and the lack of
authority of the SADC over the Organ not only caused a rift within the SADC but allowed a few
states to act militarily under the guise of the SADC. If there is no clear line of authority over all
the institutions and structures of the regional organization, it will not be able to effectively
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manage all of its operations. Following the problems over the DRC, the SADC placed the Organ
under the authority of Summit and restructured many of the institutions to make all SADC
operations more effective.
Likewise, following the problems within the interventions into Liberia, Sierra Leone and
Guinea-Bissau and the democratic transition of the majority of member states, ECOWAS
completely transformed its structures and institutions. Now there are clearly defined objectives,
clear protocols for new initiatives by the organization and methods for states to air grievances or
complaints. There are institutions to handle the regular operations of the organization, while the
highest authority remains the Summit which includes all the heads of the member states.
These movements toward stronger institutions that are clearly defined and a clear
mandate have strengthened the reputation of ECOWAS and the SADC within the international
community. ECOWAS is now seen as a major force within Africa and the strongest regional
organization on the continent. The SADC has been able to partner with other regional
organizations and move toward greater economic development within the region. Both of these
organizations are currently beginning new interventions into member states in conflict, future
research into the progress and success of these interventions may give insight into how effective
these improvements are.
There are currently no cases of completed interventions by ECOWAS or the SADC under
the current restructuring of the institutions and protocols. Therefore, it is not possible to see how
strong institutions and structures would change the likelihood of success by ECOWAS or the
SADC, until the current interventions under way by both organizations are completed. However,
through looking at the problems caused by the lack of strong institutions and protocols can be
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seen throughout the interventions by both ECOWAS and the SADC. Using Mills methods and
analyzing the effects of varying levels of institutionalization from no security structure to a
poorly defined security structure shows that there is very little difference. Whether nonexistent or
poorly defined there was no change to the likelihood of success because they caused severe
problems in both instances.

Hegemon or Strong Leading Power
The existence of a regional hegemon was also a part of what made the interventions into
Liberia and Sierra Leone successful. Nigeria was able to fund and supply troops toward the
peacekeeping operations while still remaining relatively neutral and its actions legitimate by
working through ECOWAS. Nigeria was also able to use its influence to encourage other states
to become involved in Liberia as well. The influence of hegemons was also pivotal to the
interventions by the SADC. Both South Africa and Zimbabwe were major players in the region.
They were able to influence other states to join in their initiatives and work toward peaceful
solutions. However, it was when the two hegemons disagreed that problems arose and threatened
to destroy the entire organization. This shows that regional organizations can become struggles
for power. As was proven by Mandela and Mugabe as they were unable to work together to find
solutions because they both wanted control over SADC initiatives.
The need for a strong hegemon was seen in the ECOWAS interventions into Sierra Leone
and Guinea-Bissau. Once Nigeria was no longer willing to be a major player in the intervention
in Sierra Leone it was necessary for the UN to take over the peacekeeping mission in the
country. In Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria was unwilling to take on the leadership role of the
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intervention or even contribute troops as it was too focused on internal affairs as part of their
transition to a democratic government. The mission into Guinea-Bissau was rife with problems
including a lack of sufficient troops and equipment for a successful intervention. However,
Nigeria still played a diplomatic role in offering up a place for the peace talks to be held.
In the SADC intervention into Lesotho, the two major powers of the region were joined
together. Zimbabwe and South Africa were both working together on the intervention. Despite
the two hegemons being on the same side, there were still problems and the intervention was
considered to be an initial embarrassment. While the military intervention was considered
flawed, the diplomatic efforts and peace talks that were led by South Africa did bring some
stability and peace to Lesotho. Therefore, a region hegemon is not the sole component needed
for a successful intervention but as seen in the ECOWAS interventions it can be one factor that
makes a very big difference in success or failure. The SADC intervention into the DRC may
suggest that the presence of two states fighting to be regional hegemons may create more
problems and not be as helpful toward successful intervention as one single hegemon.
Using Mills methods it is clear that a strong, single hegemon is the strongest predictor of
success for a regional organization’s attempts at intervention. When Nigeria was not present for
the Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau interventions there was no chance of success without
outside involvement. Even when there were two hegemons working together there was not as
much chance of success for the intervention, when the two hegemons were at odds the
intervention had even less chance of success. With so many states within African regional
organizations militarily and financially weak, it is necessary for a regional hegemon or
international organization to fill the military and financial gap.
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The need for a hegemon does lend credence to the realist claim that international
organizations are mirrors of the balance of power system. Even in African regional organizations
the regional hegemon dominates the decision making and heads the intervention force because
they are more powerful and able to do so. However, with the intervention led by two hegemons,
even when they agreed, it was not a guarantee of success. The intervention by Zimbabwe and
South Africa into Lesotho was not successful even though both hegemons were in agreement
over the need for military force in the country.

Were Regional Organizations Successful in their Goals?
If stability is more important than democracy in African regional organizations, then the
success of intervention should be measured by the ability to create stability within the state. In
the case of the ECOWAS intervention into Liberia, it was able to bring some semblance of
stability to the region. The 1998 intervention brought initial stability to the capital city and was
eventually able to secure the entire state. When rebels entered the country again and ECOWAS
was once again called for help, stability was quickly established. Both initiatives required the aid
and support of the UN, with the UN even taking over ECOWAS forces to control the second
intervention.
Today, Liberia is a poor but stable country. The economy is slowly growing and
repression and violence within the country is on the decline. There have been two rounds of free
and fair elections as rated by a number of independent monitors and there have been no
significant threats to the government since 2006 when the new government took power. In terms
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of stability and democracy, the end result in Liberia might be labeled as a success but it was not
without its shortcomings.
ECOMOG was poorly run and had little political direction from ECOWAS. This did not
change even in subsequent interventions in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. These interventions
though poorly run and mismanaged, did bring some semblance of stability and in both cases the
countries moved toward a more liberalized regime. However, in the case of Guinea-Bissau
fighting continued on the edges of the country even as ECOWAS was pulling out to give control
to the new government. Sierra Leone continued to struggle for stability within its borders when a
joint effort by the UN, and the United States training troops from Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal to
help with the UN mission occurred.187 It was only after this joint effort that tentative peace and
stability came to Sierra Leone.
While there were significant problems with the interventions and they lasted several
years, they were still able to bring countries in chaos to some semblance of stability. The biggest
issue that ECOWAS and their forces must change for the future is that in each case of ECOWAS
intervention there was knowledge of other ECOWAS states lending support to the other side. 188
In terms of an SADC intervention, there has yet to be a united effort by the SADC to
bring stability to another state. The two major interventions by the SADC have been into Lesotho
and the DRC. The intervention in to Lesotho was spearheaded by South Africa and was largely
hailed as a disaster and an embarrassment to South Africa. The intervention included Botswana,
Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and was met with resistance from both the Lesotho army and the
people of Lesotho. The country largely disintegrated into chaos.
187
188

(Adebajo, 2002, p. 102)
(Adebajo, 2002, pp. 48, 82,)

101

The failure in Lesotho is understood due to the fact that South Africa was still a fledging
country and the operation into Lesotho was poorly managed and poorly thought out. It was also
criticized that South Africa so readily deployed military forces in Lesotho a mere month after
speaking out against the military intervention into the DRC. It was only after South Africa
abandoned the failed military operation that diplomatic efforts were successful.
The DRC intervention was also unsuccessful in bringing stability to the country. Even
after the establishment of a democratic government, the country continued to be fraught with
violence and extreme poverty. The elections that were held were found to be suspect and full of
problems as reported by several election observers. The success of the second intervention into
the DRC has yet to be seen.
ECOWAS is now involved in an intervention into Mali and the SADC has moved into
Madagascar in the hopes of bringing stability to both of these countries. These new interventions
have only begun in 2012, so it will be a new test to see if the restructured institutions and greater
stability of the organizations will lead to greater success.

Limitations of African Regional Organizations
None of the interventions by ECOWAS or the SADC would have had a chance of being
successful without the support of the UN and western allies. Even when the western nations were
unable to send troops or intervene themselves, they offered political and financial support to the
operations. In the case of the UN, a truly neutral force was introduced to help with peace
agreements and disarmament processes.

102

African nations do not have the resources or the economies to intervene militarily without
the support of the west. Even with the recent progress of ECOWAS and SADC toward creating a
growing economic community, the interventions planned into the DRC, Mali and Madagascar
will depend on support from the AU and the UN. It will be a very long time before these
organizations will be able to run a peacekeeping mission on their own, as it was shown in the
case of the military intervention into the DRC. Zimbabwe and her allies had very little
international support and even with the incentives from Kabila, the economy of Zimbabwe has
yet to recover from that expense.
ECOWAS and the SADC also have had several issues with neutrality. Their states are
always very close to the situation and this was detrimental to the interventions. There were states
that choose to support the rebel forces rather than ECOWAS forces during the Liberian
intervention.189 There are long standing grudges, alliances and even the hope for monetary gain
that can prevent African states from being neutral in their endeavors or truly working for peace.
Several of the peace agreements that were attempted by the SADC for the DRC conflict failed
because of neutrality issues. The states involved in the military intervention had too much to gain
from the continuing conflict.
The assistance of UN monitoring groups and support can help African regional
organizations present a neutral front and give them a stronger argument for peace agreements.
Western nations will have to continue to fund interventions, but they will have the benefit of not
needing to use their own forces. The United States was happy to train African forces to be sent
on UN missions, because it reduced the need for American or western troops to intervene. There
have also been instances where African heads of state will only allow African peacekeeping
189
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forces into their country, and this is where partnerships between the UN and African regional
organizations will continue to be beneficial.
Even with their limitations, African regional organizations offer an at home approach to
conflict. They are African and know better than any other region the problems they face and the
obstacles that must be overcome in order to reach stability. Western states support the idea of
“African solutions African problems” because it reduces the strain on their own resources and it
prevents the need to deploy troops in Africa, a sensitive topic since the failure of western
peacekeeping missions in the nineties.
African regional organizations can offer rough and ready opportunities for quickly
establishing stability and movements toward a stable regime. Both the SADC and ECOWAS
were able to bring security to the capitals of the countries where they intervened within a matter
of months; lasting stability however was a much harder issue. They have the ability of building
economic communities that may one day have the power to enforce economic constraints on
member states in response to human rights or political abuses. ECOWAS has not only
established free trade arrangements but free movement of citizens of member states between all
other states. They have created an investment bank that spurs development projects within all 15
of its member states. The SADC has created a growing economic community with ties to other
communities to offer unparalleled trading options to encourage growth.
African regional organizations need to develop strong institutions and mechanisms for
the deployment of peacekeeping troops and initiatives if they are going to continue to intervene
in member states. The existence of a single regional hegemon has proven to be helpful, if
somewhat problematic in terms of neutrality, to successful intervention. Most importantly the
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national interests of the member states will need to coincide for any initiative toward stability or
democracy to be successful.
Currently the value of African organizations is seen in their ability to respond to conflict
and stabilize the region. Stability is the goal for both ECOWAS and the SADC because that is
the only way for their regional trade agreements to be successful. At the core of both
organizations is the belief that only through the growth of their economies can development and
lasting stability come to the region. Until the economic goals of African regional organizations
are met, they will not be able to respond to conflict entirely on their own. They will always need
the support of the UN and the AU to have effective solutions to regimes in crisis.
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